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ABSTRACT 
 
 This article analyzes the international emissions trading regime at the heart of the 
world’s effort to address global warming as a means of exploring broader international 
governance issues.  The trading regime seeks to marry two models of global governance, 
market liberalism, which embraces markets as the model of global governance, and 
sustainable development, which seeks to change development patterns to protect future 
generations.  This article explores emissions trading’s implications for understanding the 
relationship between these ideals.     
    
 This article presents new data and theory unsettling the traditional view that 
market mechanisms encourage innovations vital to sustainable development.  Market 
actors fail to take positive spillovers, e.g. benefits accruing to competitors and thence to 
future generations, into account in making technological choices.  Because of this failure 
to take long-term economic development into account, the international trading markets 
have contributed far less to sustainable energy development than more targeted programs. 
 
 Consideration of these spillovers yields fresh insights.  Market liberalism’s ideal 
of comprehensive evaluation of costs and benefits conflicts with its preference for free 
markets.  Conversely, sustainable development advocates’ tendency to rely on collective 
decision-making to make difficult technological choices may prove unrealistic.  This 
article unsettles prevailing notions of governance and seeks to stimulate a richer more 
subtle discourse about the roles of government and markets in addressing global 
problems.   
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Sustainable Development and Market Liberalism’s Shotgun Wedding: 
Emissions Trading Under the Kyoto Protocol 
 
David M. Driesen 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 
 An entrepreneur in India wishes to implement a project reducing emissions of 
greenhouse gases, which trap heat and thereby contribute to global warming.1  She plans 
to sell credits representing her project’s emission reductions to owners of coal-fired 
power plants in Germany, who face emission reduction obligations under the Kyoto 
Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (Kyoto 
Protocol or Kyoto).2  Under the Kyoto Protocol’s emission trading programs, these plant 
owners can purchase credits reflecting the emission reductions generated by foreign 
environmental projects in lieu of making all of the required greenhouse gas reductions at 
their own facilities.3  So, if our entrepreneur develops a suitable project, a European 
company may pay her for the credits her emission reduction project generates, enabling 
her to make a profit.   
                                                 
 1 See ANDREW E. DESSLER & EDWARD A. PARSON, SCIENCE AND POLITICS OF GLOBAL 
CLIMATE CHANGE:  A GUIDE TO THE DEBATE 8 (2006) (explaining that greenhouse gases warm the earth by 
absorbing infrared radiation that would otherwise escape into space).  
 2 December 11, 1997, Report to the Conference of the Parties on its Third Session, 3rd 
Sess. Pt. 2, Annex I, U.N. Doc. FCCC/CP/1997/7/add.1, 37 I.L.M. 22 [hereinafter Kyoto Protocol].  See 
generally FARHANA YAMIN & JOANNA DEPLEDGE, THE INTERNATIONAL CLIMATE CHANGE REGIME:  A 
GUIDE TO RULES, INSTITUTIONS, AND PROCEDURES (2004); MICHAEL GRUBB ET AL., THE KYOTO 
PROTOCOL:  A GUIDE AND ASSESSMENT (1999).  
 3 See Kyoto Protocol, supra note 2, art. 12; Kevin A. Baumert, Note, Participation of 
Developing Countries in the International Climate Change Regime:  Lessons for the Future, 38 GEO. 
WASH. INT’L L. REV. 365, 383 (2006) (explaining that the Kyoto Protocol’s “Clean Development 
Mechanism” allows “companies from industrialized countries to . . . receive emission reduction credits 
from projects based in developing countries.”).  See generally David M. Driesen, Free Lunch or Cheap 
Fix?:  The Emissions Trading Idea and the Climate Change Convention, 26 B. C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 1, 
27-35 (1998) (analyzing the key language in the Kyoto Protocol authorizing trading).  In all likelihood, the 
producer can only substitute credits for “some” of her reductions, because the Kyoto Protocol requires that 
trading function as a supplement to domestic reductions.  See Kyoto Protocol, supra note 2, arts. 6(1)(d), 
12(3)(b), 17.  For any particular producer, the extent of permissible reliance on foreign credits will depend 
upon domestic trading rules implementing the Kyoto Protocol’s “supplementarity” requirement.   
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 Let us assume that she faces a choice between two emission reduction projects.  
One project involves using an end-of-the-pipe technology to control HFC 23, a potent 
greenhouse gas.4  The other involves installing a new type solar energy technology, a 
form of renewable energy, thereby avoiding emissions of carbon dioxide, the most 
ubiquitous greenhouse gas.5  In this situation, our entrepreneur would likely choose the 
option that produces the cheapest emission reductions.6  Since HFC 23 control usually 
costs less than solar power installation, she would likely choose the end-of-the-pipe 
option.7  Is this society’s best choice?   
                                                 
 4 See PricewaterhouseCoopers (P) Ltd., CDM Project Design Document:  Project for GHG 
Emission Reduction by Thermal Oxidation of HFC 23 at HCFC 22 Plant of Gujarat Fluorochemicals 
Limited at 8 (2003), http://cdm.unfccc.int/Projects/registered.html [hereinafter HFC PDD] (describing 
installation and operation of a thermal oxidation system to control HFC 23 emissions). 
 5 See Inho Choi, Global Climate Change and the Use of Economic Approaches:  The Ideal 
Design Features of Domestic Greenhouse Gas Emissions Trading and an Analysis of the European 
Union’s CO2 Emissions Trading Directive and the Climate Stewardship Act, 45 NAT. RESOURCES J. 865, 
936 (2005) (explaining that renewable energy reduces emissions by avoiding fossil fuel combustion); 
WORKING GROUP III TO THE SECOND ASSESSMENT REPORT OF THE INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON 
CLIMATE CHANGE, CLIMATE CHANGE 1995 - ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL DIMENSIONS OF CLIMATE CHANGE 
241 (James P. Bruce et al. eds., 1996) (noting that renewable energy sources emit little carbon and that 
switching to them reduces emissions); Kirsten Engel, The Dormant Commerce Clause Threat to Market-
Based Environmental Regulation:  The Case of Electricity Deregulation, 26 ECOLOGY L. Q. 243, 270 n. 73 
(1999).  See generally Simone Espey, Renewable Portfolio Standard:  A Means for Trade With Electricity 
from Renewable Energy Sources, 29 ENERGY POL’Y 557, 558 (2001) (explaining that renewable resources 
are “inexhaustible”). 
 6 A perceptive reader may notice that these technological options involve choosing 
between reductions of two different greenhouse gases and wonder how one assesses their relative values.  
See generally James Salzman & J.B. Ruhl, Currencies and the Commodification of Environmental Law, 53 
STAN. L. REV. 607 (2000) (explaining that choosing a common currency for environmental benefits trades 
can prove problematic).  The climate change regime employs scientific assessment of different greenhouse 
gases’ relative contributions to global warming to create trading ratios, measuring the value of all relevant 
emission reductions in carbon dioxide equivalents.  See Richard B. Stewart & Jonathan B. Wiener, The 
Comprehensive Approach to Global Climate Policy:  Issues of Design and Practicability, 9 ARIZ. J. INT’L 
& COMP. L. 83, 86 (1992); INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE (IPCC), WORKING GROUP I, 
IPCC THIRD ASSESSMENT REPORT:  THE SCIENTIFIC BASIS, ch. 6, pt. 12, subpt. 2 (2001), available at 
http://www.grida.no/climate/ipcc_tar/wg1/248.htm.  For a potent greenhouse gas like HFC 23, a relatively 
small amount of reduction can generate a “carbon benefit” (i.e. reduced warming) equal to a relatively large 
carbon dioxide reduction.  For purposes of understanding the text’s hypothetical problem, the reader should 
assume that both technological options deliver the same amount of carbon dioxide equivalents.  Also, this 
Article uses the term “carbon” in isolation to refer to carbon dioxide equivalents.          
 7 See Karan Capoor & Philippe Ambrosi, State of the Carbon Market 2006 i (2006),  
http://carbonfinance.org/docs/StateoftheCarbonMarket2006 (characterizing HFC projects as the “lowest-
cost options” and therefore becoming the “first asset class to be systematically tapped globally.”); Xingshu 
Zhao & Axel Michaelowa, CDM Potential for Rural Transition in China Case Study:  Options in Yinzhou 
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 Two key concepts tend to shape observers’ answers to this question and a host of 
other questions about how to approach a global environmental challenge like that 
stemming from global warming.  One concept, that of market liberalism, tends to favor 
free global markets and the use of economic principles developed to describe ideal 
markets.8  Another concept, that of sustainable development, emphasizes adequately 
meeting the current generation’s basic needs while protecting future generations.9   
 If we view emissions trading as a mechanism that happily marries sustainable 
development and market liberalism we would assume that society should prefer HFC 23 
control, the least cost option.  This happy marriage view suggests that selection of a cost 
effective solution is always a good outcome that provides for sustainable development 
and allows the free market to work its magic.10            
   If we do not view emissions trading as a happy marriage between sustainable 
development and market liberalism, however, the choice of the HFC control option may 
appear problematic.  We may believe that free markets tend to favor the current 
generation’s interests over those of future generations, and that emissions trading markets 
conform to this tendency.  This HFC 23 comes from production of HCFC 22, an ozone-
depleting substance used in refrigeration.11  The international community, including 
India, has agreed to phase out HCFC 22 under the Montreal Protocol on Substances that 
                                                                                                                                                 
District, Zhejiang Province, 34 ENERGY POL’Y 1867, 1876 (2006) (finding the initial cost of solar 
installation high, even though over the long term it is cost competitive). 
 8 See Douglas A. Kysar, Sustainable Development and Private Global Governance, 83 
TEX. L. REV. 2109, 2116 (2005).  
 9 See WORLD COMMISSION ON ENVIRONMENT & DEVELOPMENT (WCED), OUR COMMON 
FUTURE 8 (1987) (defining sustainable development as development meeting the current generation’s needs 
without compromising future generations’ ability to meet their own needs).  
 10 See Baumert supra note 3, at 384 (explaining that the CDM encourages private sector 
project development to seek out the least cost reductions); cf.  David M. Driesen, Markets are Not Magic, 
20 ENVTL FORUM 19 (Nov. - Dec. 2003) (discussing the “tendency to view the free market as a magical 
solution environmental problems”).  
 11 See HFC PDD, supra note 4, at 8.  
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Deplete the Ozone Layer.12  This HFC project promises a perfectly good greenhouse gas 
emission reduction, which would help ameliorate future climate change.  But it provides 
a technological benefit that will only help the current generation, not future generations.13   
This facility should shut down anyway at some point and HFC 23 control would lose all 
value to society.14   
 The solar technology also reduces greenhouse gas emissions, but this reduction 
could continue indefinitely15 (unlike the reduction in HFC 23, which only provides a real 
additional benefit during the HCFC 22 plant’s short remaining life).  Moreover, 
deployment of an experimental solar option might contribute to solving the most 
important long-term technological problem at the heart of climate change, how to run 
advanced industrial economies without ever increasing fossil fuel use.16  For burning 
fossil fuels creates carbon dioxide, the most important greenhouse gas contributing to 
                                                 
 12 Sept. 16, 1987, S. TREATY DOC. NO. 100-10 (1987), 1522 UNTS 3; see Menoj 
Mehrota, Possible Alternative Approaches to Assessing the Baseline Scenario for Destruction of HFC 23 in 
the HCFC 22 Industry at 2,  http://cdm.unfccc.int/methodologies/inputam0001/ Comment_AM0001_ 
SRF_071004.pdf (noting that India has ratified the Montreal Protocol with its London and Beijing 
Amendments and has passed implementing regulations addressing HCFC 22); see also Executive 
Committee of the Multilateral Fund for the Implementation of the Montreal Protocol, Country Program 
Update, India at 3, UNEP/OzL.Pro/ExCom/49/37 (2006), http://www.multilateralfund.org/files/49/4937.pdf 
(stating that HCFC 22 production has gone up in India even while India has phased out other ozone 
depleters).  
 13 See Gerard Winn, U.N. Kyoto Chief Judges Climate Change Options, Reuters, May 30, 
2006, http://www.alertnet.org/thenews/newsdesk/L30295511.htm (criticizing the HFC 23 reduction project 
and stating that “the environmental benefits must be clear for future generations.”)  
 14 Cf. Othmar Schwank, Concerns About CDM Projects Based on Decomposition of HFC-
23 Emissions from HFC-23 Emissions from 22 HCFC Production Sites at 4 (2004), http://cdm.unfccc.int/ 
methodologies/inputam0001/Comment_AM0001_Schwank_081004.pdf  (expressing a concern that 
approval of CDM credits for emissions associated with HCFC 22 production may create an incentive to 
delay phasing out this ozone depleting chemical).  If one assumes that the carbon credits will create 
sufficient incentives to keep the HCFC 22 plant open, then the decision to use this option creates a 
continuing carbon benefit, but creates an ozone depletion cost.  Either way, the net societal value of the 
project may be less than a project that does not involve an ozone depleting production process.  
 15 See Winn, supra note 13 (recognizing renewable energy as creating “a stable structure” 
for not emitting CO2).  
 16  See RICHARD A. POSNER, CATASTROPHE:  RISK AND RESPONSE 15 (2004) (explaining that 
breakthroughs in solar technology could help enable a substitution of solar energy for fossil fuels at 
reasonable cost). 
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global warming.17  Also, fossil fuel is a non-renewable resource, meaning that it will 
eventually run out.18  If this solar experiment leads to technological developments 
significantly reducing our reliance on fossil fuels, it may help improve the welfare of the 
future generations that will need alternatives to finite fossil fuel resources.  Thus, the cost 
effective choice that the market favors may not coincide with the choice that sustainable 
development considerations favor. 
 This Article examines the question of whether emissions trading marries market 
liberalism and sustainable development.  Douglas A. Kysar has correctly identified this 
question of market liberalism’s compatibility with sustainable development as a key 
question for global environmental governance.19  Indeed, responses to this question color 
perceptions of most environmental and economic issues.20  Therefore, it is not surprising 
that the relationship between free market and sustainable development ideals has 
commanded scholars’ attention.21 
                                                 
 17 See ID. (describing global warming as largely a product of fossil fuel combustion); 
Richard B. Stewart, Economic Incentives for Environmental Protection:  Opportunities and Obstacles, in  
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW, THE ECONOMY, AND SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT  228 (RICHARD L. REVESZ ET AL. 
EDS. 2000) [hereinafter ENVIRONMENTAL LAW] (characterizing carbon dioxide as “the most important” 
greenhouse gas).  
 18 Cf. POSNER, supra note 16, at 59 (recognizing that fossil fuel resources are finite, but 
arguing that they may not be finite relative to human demand because prices will rise when they become 
scarce).  
 19 See Kysar, supra note 8, at 2114-18 (discussing the rise of market liberalism and 
international interest in sustainable development).  
 20 See generally Barbara Ann White, Economic Efficiency and the Parameters of Fairness:  
A Marriage of Marketplace Morals and the Ethic of Care, 15 CORNELL J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 1, 2 (2005) 
(discussing “the great divide” between scholars “using theories of welfare maximization derived from the 
study of market[s]” and those more concerned about equity).  
 21 See, e.g., Kysar, supra note 8, at 2118-2147 (describing tensions between market 
liberalism and sustainable development); WILLFRED BECKERMAN, A POVERTY OF REASON:  SUSTAINABLE 
DEVELOPMENT AND ECONOMIC GROWTH xii (2003) (an economist arguing that the sustainable development 
ideal is not ethically superior to the “economist’s goal of maximizing the sum of human welfare over future 
generations”); GEOFFREY HEAL, VALUING THE FUTURE:  ECONOMIC THEORY AND SUSTAINABILITY (1998);  
HERMAN E. DALY, BEYOND GROWTH:  THE ECONOMICS OF SUSTAINABILITY (1996). 
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 Emissions trading helps shape perceptions of this relationship.  Very few 
neoliberals (market liberalism advocates) condemn government regulation altogether.22  
Instead, most neoliberals support regulatory reforms that employ market concepts to 
shape environmental regulations.23  These reforms include wider use of cost-benefit 
analysis (CBA) to determine environmental regulation’s goals and of emissions trading to 
meet these goals.24  The international embrace of emissions trading under the Kyoto 
Protocol suggests that emissions trading may qualify as the most widely accepted 
neoliberal environmental reform.25  Hence, if a marriage exists anywhere, it should exist 
in the realm of emissions trading under the Kyoto Protocol.   
 This article claims that positive “spillovers” associated with technological 
choices, i.e. benefits that do not lead to increased rents for the innovator, are crucial to 
sustainable development, but often neglected by markets. If introduction of a new solar 
technology inspires technological advances by competitors, for example, this creates a 
positive spillover.  This article aim to show that positive spillovers are vital to addressing 
global climate change and shine new light on our understanding of market liberalism, 
sustainable development, and environmental law. 
 Part one of this Article provides needed background, introducing the concepts of 
market liberalism and sustainable development, explaining emissions trading, and 
                                                 
 22 See Kysar, supra note 8, at 2120 (noting that neoclassical economics does support some 
regulation). 
 23 See Thomas O. McGarity, The Expanded Debate over the Future of the Regulatory State, 
63 U. CHI. L. REV. 1463, 1492 (1996) (describing “economic efficiency” as the “guiding light” for “free 
marketers”).  
 24 See id. at 1491-97 (explaining that “free marketeers” favor CBA and market-based 
mechanisms); see, e.g., Robert W. Hahn & Robert E. Litan, 8 J. INT’L ECON. L. 473 (2005) (arguments by 
the American Enterprise Institute’s co-founders for CBA).   
 25 The term neoliberal describes a world view embracing broad reliance on global markets 
and supporting economic concepts, i.e. the view embracing market liberalism.   See Kysar, supra note 8, at 
2116. 
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providing a primer on the climate change regime.  It emphasizes emissions trading’s role 
in seeking to cement a union between sustainable development and market liberalism 
ideals.  The second part presents data on technological choices under the Kyoto Protocol, 
like the choices our entrepreneur faces.   The data raise questions about whether global 
emissions trading spurs technological innovation that aids sustainable development.  The 
third part uses the concept of positive spillovers to explore this data’s implications for 
environmental law and for the relationship between sustainable development and market 
liberalism.       
II.  EMISSIONS TRADING UNDER THE KYOTO PROTOCOL:  A PRIMER 
 This part explains market liberalism, sustainable development, and emissions 
trading.  It then provides a brief history of the Kyoto Protocol’s development and 
implementation. 
        A.  Market Liberalism and Sustainable Development 
   Market liberalism consists of two closely related components, a tendency to 
revere free markets and a set of economic concepts that provides ideological support for 
neoliberal reforms.26  The economic concepts generally stem from efforts to describe, not 
justify, markets.  But many of those employing these concepts, especially in the law and 
economics movement, use them to justify market-based solutions to problems.27  In 
general, economists tend to evaluate all policies and decisions in terms of efficiency, and 
                                                 
 26 See Kysar, supra note 8, at 2116 (identifying market liberalism with a “neoliberal 
political philosophy” and “cultural exaltation of the market”).  
 27 See, e.g., POSNER, supra note 16, at 201 (claiming that economics is both normative and 
positive).  
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leading law and economics scholars, most prominently, Richard Posner, have argued that 
efficiency constitutes an important goal for government policy.28 
 While true devotees of free markets may prefer no regulation at all, most of those 
employing economic concepts to justify markets recognize the need for some 
regulation.29  Economists generally presume that markets are efficient only when they 
generate no “externalities,” costs or benefits not reflected in prices.30  They characterize 
the harms pollution causes as “negative externalities,” e.g. as costs not reflected in market 
prices.31   They state that regulation and pollution taxes “internalize” costs associated 
with environmental harms, by raising the market price of goods and services to reflect 
their true environmental costs.32  Thus, economists regard regulation and pollution taxes 
raising electricity prices, for example, to reflect their true environmental costs (i.e. a cost 
associated with the harms they create) as efficient.33   
   This focus on efficiency tends to produce recommendations for two sets of 
regulatory reforms.  First, economists and their supporters tend to favor CBA’s use in 
establishing environmental regulation’s goals.34  Such an approach requires policy-
makers to attempt to quantify the costs and benefits of environmental policies.35  The 
                                                 
 28 See RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMICS OF JUSTICE (1983); see also Louis Kaplow v. 
Steven M. Shavell, Fairness v. Welfare, 114 HARV. L. REV. 961 (2001).  
29            See McGarity, supra note 23, at  1484-1513 (contrasting “radical anti-interventionists” 
opposing nearly all government regulation with other neoliberal groups that support refromed regulation). 
30  See David M. Driesen, The Societal Cost of Environmental Regulation:  Beyond 
Administrative Cost-Benefit Analysis, 24 ECOLOGY L. Q. 545, 552-53(1997). 
31            Id. at 553 (discussing economists’ characterization of harms from pollution as a cost 
external to the market).  
32            Id. (explaining that economists support regulating and or taxing pollution to internalize 
pollution’s cost).  
33  Id. at 577-78 (explaining the concept of an optimal, i.e. efficient, level of pollution as that 
where the marginal benefits of control equal the marginal costs). 
34            See DAVID M. DRIESEN, THE ECONOMIC DYNAMICS OF ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 1 (2003) 
(describing the “economics-based regulatory reform agenda” as including increased use of CBA). 
35             See Driesen, supra note 30, at 558 (explaining that CBA requires the comparison of 
pollution control costs with “costs” consisting of environmental and health effects).  
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costs of environmental policies come from expenditures to make technological 
improvements, like those contemplated by our entrepreneur.36   The benefits include 
prevention of human deaths and illness and preservation of ecosystems.37  Economists 
define efficient regulations as those equating costs and benefits at the margin.38  CBA 
proponents tend to favor quite comprehensive consideration of costs and benefits in 
defining policy goals, including consideration of future costs and benefits.39   
 Whether or not policymakers employ CBA in setting environmental goals, 
moderate neoliberals tend to favor using “market-based mechanisms,” principally 
emissions trading and environmental taxation, to achieve these goals.40  These 
mechanisms encourage efficiency in a different sense, the selection of least cost 
technological options for achieving any given environmental goal.41  This framework 
implies that private actors, like our Indian entrepreneur, will make their own choices 
about how to achieve a defined government goal, such as a target for carbon dioxide 
reduction, free of government influence.  Thus, market liberalism tends to leave 
technological choice to quite narrow private decision-making focusing on cost effective 
achievement of a defined government chosen environmental goal, such as a specified 
reduction in greenhouse gas emissions.  
                                                 
36            See David M. Driesen, Getting Our Priorities Straight:  One Strand of the Regulatory 
Reform Debate, 31 ENVT’L L. REP. (Envt’l L. Inst.) 10003, 10019 n. 204 (2001)  
37            See Driesen, supra note 30, at 558-59 (noting the difficulty of quantifying these benefits).  
38  Id. at 582-83; see WILLIAM J. BAUMOL & WALLACE E. OATES, THE THEORY OF 
ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY 23 (1975). 
39            See THOMAS O. MCGARITY, REINVENTING RATIONALITY: THE ROLE OF REGULATORY 
ANALYSIS IN THE FEDERAL BUREAUCRACY 5 (1996) (characterizing CBA as supporting  "comprehensive 
analytical rationality").  
40           See DRIESEN, supra note 34, at 1 (discussing use of “economic incentive” measures to 
meet environmental goals as part of the “economics-based regulatory reform agenda”). 
41          See Driesen, supra note 30, at 564-65 (explaining the difference between allocatively 
efficient goal selection and selection of cost effective means of meeting chosen goals). 
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 Market liberalism also embraces free trade, the original efficiency enhancing 
reform.42  This free trade emphasis tends to lead market liberals to favor not just 
emissions trading, but free global trading markets, where credits may be traded across 
industries and between countries.  Global trading markets enhance opportunities for 
cheap emission reductions; thereby lowering environmental protection’s cost.43            
   Sustainable development, by contrast, generally focuses on adequately meeting 
the current generation’s basic needs without impairing future generations’ ability to meet 
their own needs.44  It reflects some skepticism of the idea that free market actors choose 
developmental paths that adequately address either poverty or future generations’ needs.  
The concept originated in efforts to bridge differences between developing and developed 
countries on international law and numerous international agreements embrace 
sustainable development as a goal.45  Definitions of the concept vary and many scholars 
lament its lack of precision.46  Scholars studying sustainable development refer to the 
consideration of future generations’ needs under the rubric of intergenerational equity.47   
                                                 
 42 See David M. Driesen, What is Free Trade:  The Real Issue Lurking Behind the Trade 
and Environment Debate, 41 VA. J. INT’L L. 279, 287-291 (2001) (describing free trade’s classical origins 
and explaining that modern economists “employ an allocative efficiency test” in thinking about free trade).   
43            See Jonathan Baert Wiener, Global Environmental Regulation:  Instrument Choice in 
Legal Context, 108 YALE L. J. 677, 748 (1999) (explaining that widening participation in emissions trading 
to include developing countries reduces abatement costs).   
 44 WCED, supra note 9, at 8.  I have not attempted to provide a comprehensive account of 
sustainable development’s elements here, but instead focus on the components most relevant to this 
Article’s thesis.  Cf. John Martin Gillroy, Adjudication Norms, Dispute Settlement Regmes and 
International Tribunals:  The Status of “Environmental Sustainability” in International Jurisprudence, 42 
STAN. J. INT’L L. 1, 12 (2006) (identifying eight sustainable development “sub-principles”). 
 45 MARIE-CLAIRE CORDONIER SEGGER & ASHFAQ KHALFAN, SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT 
LAW:  PRINCIPLES, PRACTICES, AND PROSPECTS 15 (2004) (discussing sustainable development’s origins as 
a “compromise” term); PHILIPPE SANDS, GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 
252 (2003) (stating that the term sustainable development now appears regularly in international 
environmental instruments).  
 46 See, e.g., BECKERMAN, supra note 21, at xi ; SEGGER & KHALFAN, supra note 45, at 4 
(explaining that the vagueness of the sustainable development concept helped it gain universal acceptance, 
but creates “difficulties”).   
 47 See, e.g., Kysar, supra note 8, at 2118.  
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 Sustainable development involves an emphasis on integrated planning and public 
participation.48  This emphasis arises from a distinctive view of the relationship between 
economic development and environmental protection.  The report often credited with 
creating the sustainable development concept, the Brundtland Report, claims that 
environmental degradation often impedes economic development and, conversely, that 
poverty frequently causes environmental degradation.49  This view suggests that proper 
economic development choices will simultaneously protect the environment and aid 
poverty elimination and leads to support for governance reforms integrating economic 
development and environmental decision-making.50  This view of environmental policy 
and economic development as complimentary contrasts with market liberalism’s 
perspective, which tends to view environmental protection as in conflict with economic 
development, leading to a desire to carefully consider tradeoffs between them and reduce 
environmental protection’s cost.  Sustainable development implies a significant role for 
collective decision-making, presumably including government.51   
B.   Understanding Emissions Trading 
                                                 
 48 See John C. Dernbach, Sustainable Development:  Now More than Ever, in STUMBLING 
TOWARD SUSTAINABILITY 51-53, 56 (John C. Dernbach ed. 2002) [hereinafter STUMBLING]; SEGGER & 
KHALFAN, supra note 45, at 3 (explaining that sustainable development seeks to encourage integrated 
solutions to our most important problems by requiring “accommodation of between economic 
development, social justice, and environmental protection through a process requiring public participation); 
SANDS, supra note 45, at 263 (discussing integration of environment and development as an “element” of 
sustainable development); United Nations Conference on Environment and Development,  June 3-14, 1992, 
Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.151/6/Rev. 1, princ. 4 (June 16, 
1992), 31 I.L.M. 874 (stating that achievement of sustainable development requires the integration of 
environmental and developmental concerns).   
49  WCED, supra note 9, at 3. 
50             ID. at 8-11 (affirming that it is possible to make development sustainable and then 
explaining how this requires broadening the mandates of economic development and environmental 
ministries to allow for integrated consideration of the environment and economic development).  
 51 See Kysar, supra note 8, at 2147 (discussing sustainable development proponents’ 
argument for collective decision-making).  
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 Environmental law has traditionally relied heavily upon uniform performance 
standards as a means of meeting environmental goals.52  Such standards generally require 
all parts of an industry to achieve a numerically specified emission reduction target.53   
 Economists have criticized this uniform standards approach as inconsistent with 
the free market ideal of economic efficiency.54  Facilities have widely varying control 
costs.  Accordingly, facilities can achieve any aggregate target more cheaply than a 
uniform standard allows, if facilities with relatively cheap control costs make more of the 
aggregate reductions than facilities with high control costs.55  Unfortunately, regulators 
rarely have sufficient marginal cost information to tailor regulation to each facility’s 
marginal control cost.56 
 Emissions trading ingeniously corrects traditional government regulation’s failure 
to generate the cost-effective outcomes hypothesized for an ideal free market.57  The 
regulator can set the same limits as would undergird a traditional regulation, but allow 
                                                 
 52 See Bruce A. Ackerman & Richard B. Stewart, Reforming Environmental Law, 37 STAN. 
L. REV. 1333, 1335 (1985) (explaining that environmental law relies heavily upon uniform standards for 
industrial categories); cf. David M. Driesen, Is Emissions Trading an Economic Incentive Program?:  
Beyond the Command and Control/Economic Incentive Dichotomy, 55 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 289, 308 n. 93 
(1998) (arguing that commentators have exaggerated the extent of the uniform standard approach’s use); 
Driesen, supra note 3, at 36-37 (noting that the Kyoto Protocol does not impose uniform standards upon 
countries, but explaining why emissions trading increases cost effectiveness anyway); see, e.g., 33 U.S.C. § 
1312 (2000); 42 U.S.C. §§ 7411(a), 7412(d), 7521 (2000). 
 53  See Jason Johnston, Tradable Pollution Permits and the Regulatory Game, in MOVING 
TO MARKETS IN ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION:  LESSONS FROM 20 YEARS OF EXPERIENCE __ (Jody 
Freeman and Charles Kolstad eds. Oxford University Press 2006) [hereinafter MOVING TO MARKETS] 
(forthcoming) (federal environmental regulations require uniform emission reductions for facilities of the 
same approximate age in an industry category).  
 54 See id. at __ (“command and control” regulation has been “widely decried as 
inefficient”).  
 55  EMISSIONS TRADING FOR CLIMATE POLICY:  U.S. AND EUROPEAN PERSPECTIVES at 3 
(Bernd Hansjürgens, ed. 2005) [hereinafter EMISSIONS TRADING] (explaining that regulators could tailor 
standards to each firm’s marginal abatement cost). 
 56 Id. 
 57 I use the term “traditional regulation” to refer to performance standards, which require a 
particular pollution source to meet a quantitative limit for pollution outputs, and work practice standards, 
which dictate use of a particular technology or practice.  Some writers use the term “command and control” 
regulation in the same way.  See Driesen, supra note 52, at 297, n.44.  I eschew use of this term, because it 
is misleadingly suggests that performance standards dictate technological choices or that work practice 
standards dominate environmental law.  Id. at 296-302. 
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facility owners to buy emission reduction credits from over-complying facilities in lieu of 
local reductions.  This opportunity will encourage facility owners with cheap pollution 
control options to provide extra emission reductions, because they can sell credits 
representing the excess reductions to facility owners facing relatively expensive control 
options.58  Conversely, owners of facilities generating high control costs will avoid 
making reductions at their own facilities, and purchase credits from operators of facilities 
with low cost reduction options instead.59  Thus, emissions trading encourages a cost 
effective shift of reductions from high to low cost facilities.60     
 The United States enjoyed its first major success with this “market-based 
approach” in the acid rain program enacted as part of the 1990 Clean Air Act 
Amendments.61  Congress assigned emission limits to each electric utility unit generating 
sulfur dioxide, a major contributor to acid rain.62  But Congress allowed electric utility 
operators to purchase extra emission reductions realized at other capped generating units 
in lieu of local compliance.63  The program produced significant aggregate sulfur dioxide 
reductions at much lower cost than regulators had anticipated, precisely what the market 
                                                 
 58 See Geoffrey Bertram, Tradable Emissions Permits and Control of Greenhouse Gases, 
28 J. DEV. STUD. 423, 425 (1992).  
 59 Id.    
 60 Stewart, supra note 17, at 190 (describing trading as “automatically transferring” 
resources from high cost to low cost sources); see Driesen, supra note 3, at 36 (illustrating trading’s 
encouragement of cost effective reduction shifts with a numerical example). 
 61 42 U.S.C. §§ 7651-7651o (2000).  See Jacob Kreutzer, Cap and Trade:  A Behavioral 
Analysis of the Sulfur Dioxide Emissions Market, 62 NYU ANN. SURV. AM. L. 125, 129 (2006) (calling the 
acid rain program “a success by any measure”); Byron Swift, Command Without Control:  Why Cap-and-
Trade Should Replace Rate Standards for Regional Pollutants, 31 ENVTL. L. REP. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10330, 
10331-32 (2001) (explaining that the acid rain program produced early reductions and cheaper than 
expected costs); Driesen, supra note 52, at 314-17 & n. 131 (reviewing the history of trading prior to 1990). 
 62 See 42 U.S.C. §§ 7651c(e); 7651d (2000).  
 63 42 U.S.C. § 7651b(b) (2000).  
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liberalism model predicts.64  Since then, environmental benefit trading has taken off, 
becoming the most ubiquitous approach to meeting environmental standards in the 
United States.65   
C.  The Climate Change Regime Embraces Emissions Trading 
 Meanwhile, scientific evidence mounted that greenhouse gases, especially carbon 
dioxide, a byproduct of fossil fuel combustion, had warmed the earth’s average mean 
surface temperature and would likely increase warming in the future.66  Recent scientific 
papers show that global warming has already begun melting glaciers,67 raising sea 
levels,68 and intensifying hurricanes69.  But the scientific literature raises even more 
concerns about what future generations might face, if the current generation does not 
safeguard their welfare.  The literature predicts that rising sea levels will inundate coastal 
                                                 
 64 See Choi, supra note 5, at 890 (conceding, in the context of a fairly critical appraisal, that 
the acid rain program has achieved its goals); Swift, supra note 61, at 10331-32 (discussing the reductions 
and cost savings).  
 65 See Choi, supra note 5, at 892-94 (claiming that trading has been used frequently in the 
U.S. and providing examples).  While other emissions trading programs have failed because of monitoring 
and tracking difficulties, this Article will assume, perhaps unwisely, that the Kyoto trading programs will 
produce real emission reductions as planned.  See id. at 932-933 (explaining that the European Emissions 
Trading scheme does not require continuous emissions monitors in all cases).  This assumption, whether 
realistic or not, makes it easier to address the Article’s chief theoretical concern, the relationship between 
market liberalism and sustainable development.  
 66 See Zachary Tyler, Massachusetts v. EPA:  The D.C. Circuit’s Failure to Extend the 
Clean Air Act to Greenhouse Gas Emissions, 36 ENVTL. L. REP. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10456, 10457 (2006) 
(explaining the link between fossil fuel combustion and carbon dioxide); DESSLER & PARSON, supra note 1, 
at 8-10 (explaining that carbon dioxide and water vapor are the principal greenhouse gases and that by the 
1980s evidence had mounted that temperatures were warming).  
 67  GERMAN ADVISORY COUNCIL ON GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE (WGBU), THE FUTURE 
OCEANS – WARMING UP, RISING HIGH, TURNING SOURCE:  SUMMARY FOR POLICY-MAKERS 2 (2006) 
(citing “indications that the continental ice sheets on Greenland and in the Antarctic are beginning to 
disintegrate.”).  
 68 ID. at 1 (that that “the sea level is rising ever faster”); INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON 
CLIMATE CHANGE (IPCC) WORKING GROUP I, supra note 6, at 4 (finding that sea levels have risen by four 
to eight inches over the last 100 years).  
 69 Kerri Emanuel, Increasing Destructiveness of Tropical Cyclones over the Past 30 Years, 
436 NATURE 686 (2005) (showing a correlation between the increased destructiveness of tropical cyclones 
and average mean surface temperature); WGBU, supra note 43, at 2 (stating that both “observed data” and 
mathematical models show that global warming boosts hurricanes’ “destructive energy.”).  See generally 
DESSLER & PARSON, supra note 1, at 83 (explaining that because the strength of tropical cyclones depends 
on sea surface temperatures, “there is a good basis” to expect more intense hurricanes and typhoons). 
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areas and small island states.70  It predicts more violent future weather events, droughts in 
areas where many people already suffer from malnutrition, and the proliferation of 
tropical diseases in areas where they have hitherto afflicted nobody.71  Global warming 
may also lead to rapid ecological changes accelerating many species’ extinction.72   
 The international community responded to the mounting scientific evidence that 
human activities seriously disrupt the global climate by enacting the United Nations 
Framework Convention on Climate Change (Framework Convention) in 1992.73   The 
Framework Convention reflects both international support for the sustainable 
development ideal and market liberalism’s ascendancy. 
   The Framework Convention proclaims that “the Parties . . . should . . . promote 
sustainable development”74 and “protect the climate system for the benefit of future 
generations. . .”75  This proclamation is consistent with the intergenerational concerns at 
the heart of sustainable development.76  The Framework Convention’s general goal more 
concretely expresses sustainable development’s possible meaning in this context by 
declaring an “ultimate objective” of stabilizing “greenhouse gas concentrations in the 
                                                 
 70 IPCC WORKING GROUP II, CLIMATE CHANGE 2001:  IMPACTS, ADAPTATION, AND 
VULNERABILITY, at sec. 19.3.4.1 (2001) (discussing the vulnerability of Antigua, the Cook Islands, the 
Federated States of Micronesia, Kiribati, the Maldives, the Marshall Islands, Nevis, Tonga, and Tuvalu); 
WGBU, supra note 43, at 2 (“Sea-level rise will lead to inundation of coasts and small island states. . .”).  
 71 ID. at 5-6, 12, 489.  
 72 ELIZABETH KOLBERT, FIELD NOTES FROM A CATASTROPHE 84-85 (2006) (reporting 
biologists’ preliminary estimate of species extinction as between 15% and 37%); Note, Ratification of 
Kyoto Aside:  How International Law and Market Uncertainty Obviate the Current U.S. Approach to 
Climate Change Emissions, 47 WM. & MARY L. REV. 2089, 2093 (2006) [hereinafter Ratification Aside] 
(discussing studies predicting “devastating consequences” for polar bears and certain seals); IPCC 
WORKING GROUP II, supra note 46, at 19.2.2.2.     
 73 May 29, 1992, U.N. Doc. A/AC.237/18 (1992), 31 I.L.M. 849 [hereinafter FCCC].  See 
generally Daniel Bodansky, The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change:  A 
Commentary, 18 YALE J. INT’L L. 451 (1993).  
 74 FCCC, supra note 73, art. 3(4).  
 75 Id., art. 3(1).  
 76 See generally EDITH BROWN WEISS, IN FAIRNESS TO FUTURE GENERATIONS:  
INTERNATIONAL LAW, COMMON PATRIMONY, AND INTERNATIONAL EQUITY (1989).  
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atmosphere at a level that would prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference with the 
climate system. . .”77 
 The Framework Convention simultaneously embraces market liberalism by 
stating that “policies and measures should be cost-effective so as to ensure global benefits 
at the lowest possible cost.”78   Employing the language of neoliberal CBA proponents 
this clause refers to measures reducing greenhouse gas emissions not as avoiding harm, 
but as ensuring “benefits.”79  At the same time, this language suggests the need for 
emissions trading by establishing cost-effectiveness as a major objective of the climate 
change regime.80  This language did not enter the agreement by accident.  The United 
States, a leading bastion of market liberalism, resisted mandatory emission reduction 
targets, partially because it considered their achievement too costly.81  United States 
negotiators also argued that liberal international emissions trading should become part of 
the agreement.82  This position created a tension between the United States and countries 
more interested in binding limits and skeptical of emissions trading.83  This tension led to 
a clause establishing an “aim of returning individually or jointly to . . . 1990” developed 
                                                 
 77 FCCC, supra note 73, art. 2.  
 78 Id.   
 79 Cf. Driesen, supra note 30, at 560-61 & n. 67 (pointing out that cost-benefit proponents’ 
use the word “benefits” to describe averted harms).  
 80 See SANDS, supra note 45, at 365-66 (linking the joint implementation provision to the 
Framework Convention’s language on cost effectiveness); Driesen, supra note 3, at 15-18 (explaining that 
the language surrounding the cost effectiveness principle seems to qualify it, but that “cost effectiveness 
concerns have tended to dominate debates about implementation of the Climate Change Convention.”).  
 81 SANDS, supra note 45, at 360 (stating that the United States publicly opposed specific 
targets and timetables for greenhouse gas emission reductions); James A. Beard, An Application of the 
Principles of Sustainability to the Problem of Global Climate Change:  An Argument for Integrated Energy 
Services, 11 J. ENVTL. L. & LIT. 191, 203 (1996) (discussing the U.S. effort to defeat a proposal for a 20% 
emissions cut).  
 82  See Ratification Aside, supra note 72, at 2101 (attributing the inclusion of some trading 
provisions to “U.S. pressure”). 
 83 See SANDS, supra note 45, at 365 (pointing out that the European Union and other 
countries supported a clear commitment to stabilizing greenhouse gas emissions at 1990 levels).  
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country greenhouse gas emission levels.84    This language established an emission 
reduction goal in lieu of an emission reduction requirement.85  And the reference to joint 
achievement of the stabilization “aim” suggests using international emissions trading to 
achieve this goal.86   
 The United States continued its emissions trading advocacy and its opposition to 
binding emission reduction targets during the meetings that produced the Kyoto 
Protocol.87  This placed the United States in tension with the EU, which supported strict 
targets and less use of trading.88  Then Vice-President Al Gore helped break an impasse 
that threatened to scuttle a Kyoto agreement, by signaling the United States’ willingness 
to accept modest binding emission reduction targets in exchange for a liberal 
international emissions trading regime.89  The resulting Kyoto Protocol generally 
obligates advanced industrialized countries to deliver emission reductions representing a 
5% cut below their joint 1990 emission levels, but allowed them to substitute carbon 
credits generated abroad for some of these cuts. 90 
                                                 
 84 FCCC, supra note 73, art. 4(2)(b); see PRUE TAYLOR, AN ECOLOGICAL APPROACH TO 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 332 (1998) (describing this compromise as a “watering down of obligations” 
achieved through a U.S. threat to boycott the talks). 
 85 See Bodansky, supra note 73, at 515-17 (describing this clause as establishing a “quasi-
target”).  
 86 See Driesen, supra note 3, at 28 (explaining that the “joint implementation” language 
suggests authorization of trading, but could also be interpreted as contemplating one country helping 
another achieve reductions without credit sales).  
 87 See DESSLER & PARSON, supra note 1, at 14 (discussing the Clinton Administration’s 
initial reluctance to accept mandatory emission reductions).  
 88 See ID. at 15 (describing the tension between the U.S. and EU on the liberality of 
trading); Axel Michaelowa & Sonja Butzengeiger, EU Emissions Trading:  Navigating Between Scylla and 
Charybdis, 5 CLIMATE POL’Y 1, 2 (2005) (noting that the EU opposed international trading in the “run-up” 
to the Kyoto conference). 
 89 See Joby Warrick, Gore Urges Resolution at Climate Talks; With Summit in Disarray, 
Vice-President Prods U.S. Negotiators to Bridge Gaps, WASH. POST, Dec. 8, 1998, at A1 (describing the 
U.S. compromise accepting a 7% reduction target); James H. Searles, Analysis of the Kyoto Protocol to the 
U.N. Framework Convention on Climate Change, 21 INT’L ENV’T REP. (BNA) 131, 133 (Feb. 4, 1998) 
(U.S. demanded emissions trading in exchange for legally binding emissions reductions).  
 90 See Kyoto Protocol, supra note 2, art. 3(1) (requiring industrialized countries to reduce 
their emissions by the amounts assigned in annex B “with a view to reducing their overall emissions by at 
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 The Kyoto Protocol provides for no less than three international emission trading 
programs, usually referred to as the Kyoto “flexibility mechanisms,” as a means of 
achieving the reduction targets for individual countries.91  Article 17 authorizes trades of 
national allowances among the developed countries that assumed reduction obligations 
under the Kyoto Protocol.92  Article 6, the joint implementation provision, authorizes 
project-based trades among developed countries or among private parties within 
developed countries.93  Article 12 establishes a Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) 
that authorizes developed countries, or private companies within developed countries, to 
purchase credits from projects in developing countries, even though developing countries 
have assumed no emission reduction obligations under the Kyoto Protocol.94  The CDM’s 
“purpose is to assist” developing countries in “achieving sustainable development.”95  
 In order to meet CDM’s sustainable development goals, the parties to the Kyoto 
Protocol established a process for public participation and collective decision-making in 
choosing CDM projects.96  This process requires “designated operational authorities” 
(often a private consulting firm paid for by project developers) to provide for public 
                                                                                                                                                 
least 5 per cent below 1990 levels.”); Kyoto Parties End Meetings With Consensus for Avoiding Gap in 
Post-2012 Reductions, 37 ENVTL. REP. (BNA) 1154 (2006) (explaining that “The Kyoto Protocol . . . 
requires 36 industrialized countries . . . to collectively reduce carbon dioxide emissions about 5 percent 
below 1990 levels. . .”).  
 91 See LEGAL ASPECTS OF IMPLEMENTING THE KYOTO PROTOCOL MECHANISMS 175 (David 
Freestone & Charlotte Streck eds. 2005) [hereinafter, KYOTO MECHANISMS] (introducing Joint 
Implementation, Emissions Trading, and the Clean Development Mechanism as the three “market-oriented 
mechanisms” provided for in the Kyoto Protocol); SANDS, supra note 45, at 372 (listing the flexibility 
mechanisms as “emissions trading, joint implementation, and the Clean Development Mechanism”); cf. 
Stewart, supra note 17, at 238 (interpreting the Kyoto Protocol as providing four different economic 
incentive systems).  
 92 Kyoto Protocol, supra note 2, art. 17.  
 93 Id. art. 6.  
 94 Id. art. 12.  
 95 Id. art. 12(2).  The CDM also aims to contribute to achieving the Framework 
Convention’s objective of avoiding dangerous climate change and assisting developed countries in 
complying with their emission reduction obligations.  Id.  
 96 See KYOTO MECHANISMS, supra note 91, at 71-104. 
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comment on proposed projects, estimate emission reductions, and validate the subsequent 
emissions. 97 A designated national authority within the country hosting the project 
reviews the project for compatibility with sustainable development goals.98  An 
international executive board reviews credit estimation techniques and exercises 
oversight.99   
D.  Implementation 
 President George W. Bush renounced the Kyoto Protocol shortly after coming 
into office, thereby depriving the climate change regime of support from the world’s 
largest greenhouse gas emitter.100   In spite of this setback, the Kyoto Protocol entered 
into force in 2005, and most of world’s developed countries have begun to implement 
it.101   
 Thanks to the United States federal government’s absence,102 the EU and its 
member states have become the most important actors in shaping Kyoto 
implementation103.  The EU has used a variety of approaches to meeting its Kyoto targets.   
                                                 
 97 See ID. at 198-202 (describing the role of designated operational authorities).  
 98 See ID. at 213-219 (explaining that the role of the designated national authority includes 
review for sustainability).  
 99 ID. at 202 (stating that the executive board reviews projects for environmental integrity).  
 100 See ID. at 370 (stating that Bush’s repudiation of the Kyoto Protocol in early 2001 threw 
the Protocol into doubt, because the U.S. emits about a quarter of the world’s greenhouse gases); 
Transcript, Bush Press Conference at the White House, March 29, 2001, 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/03/20010329.html (explaining President Bush’s concerns 
about cost and the ineffectiveness of the agreement); see also S. Res. 98, 105th Cong. (1997) (enacted) 
(disapproving of climate change agreements that do not mandate developing country emission reductions 
and expressing cost concerns).   
 101 See DESSLER & PARSON, supra note 1, at 26 (noting that the Kyoto Protocol entered into 
force on February 16, 2005). 
 102 See Kirsten H. Engel, Mitigating Global Climate Change in the United States  A Regional 
Approach, 14 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L. J. 54, 55 (2005) (noting “the absence of the federal government’s 
participation in the Kyoto Protocol”); Kirsten H. Engel and Scott R. Saleska, The Subglobal Regulation of 
the Global Commons: The Case of Climate Change, 32 ECOLOGY L. Q. 183, 186 (2005) (pointing out that 
the United States federal government has “eschewed substantive regulation”); cf.  Deborah Keeth, The 
California Climate Law:  A State’s Cutting Edge Efforts to Achieve Clean Air, 30 ECOLOGY L. Q. 715 
(2003) (discussing California climate change law); Gary C. Bryner, Carbon Markets:  Reducing 
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 1.  The European Union’s Emissions Trading Scheme. - As we saw, the EU 
reluctantly accepted a global trading regime in the hopes of obtaining reductions from the 
United States in return.  Even though the effort to combine market liberalism and 
sustainable development under the Kyoto canopy attempts something of a shotgun 
marriage,104 the EU moved rapidly to adopt a trading scheme after it signed the Kyoto 
accord105. 
 The European Parliament adopted a two-phased trading program requiring 
individual countries to establish limits for the carbon dioxide emissions of listed major 
industrial sources, such as power plants.106  This trading program, however, does not 
confine itself to trades between capped sources in Europe.  It allows regulated European 
polluters to purchase credits generated by projects approved under the Kyoto Protocol’s 
CDM and Joint Implementation provisions to satisfy part of their compliance 
obligations.107  The European Parliament adopted this global liberalization of the trading 
regime specifically to advance the sustainable development goal by facilitating resource 
transfers to developing countries and to further the cost effectiveness goal by increasing 
the availability of cheap credits.108  Thus, the EU embraced, to a remarkable degree, the 
                                                                                                                                                 
Greenhouse Gas Emissions Through Emissions Trading, 17 TUL. ENVTL. L. J. 267, 273 (2004) (describing 
the Bush Administration’s plan to address climate change without meeting Kyoto targets).    
 103 See Choi, supra note 5, at 952 (stating that the European Emissions Trading Scheme 
“will provide important lessons to the rest of the world,” including the U.S.).  
 104  Michael A. Mehling, Emissions trading and National Allocation in the Member States-An 
Achilles’ Heel of European Climate Policy, 5 Y.B. EUR. ENVTL. L. 113, 118-19 (2005) (describing 
emissions trading as something “largely adopted in response” to U.S. “pressure”). 
 105 Id. at 123, 127 (describing EU decision to adopt trading after “notoriously” opposing it as 
a “remarkable shift” and noting that it moved from proposal to adoption in “less than four years.”).  
 106 See Council Directive 2003/87, 2003 O.J. (L 275); Rie Watanabe & Guy Robinson, The 
European Union Emissions Trading Scheme, 5 CLIMATE CHANGE 10 (2005) (explaining the particulars of 
the scheme); B. Mortensen, The EU Emissions Trading Directive, 14 EUR. ENVTL. L. REV. 275 (2004).  
 107 See Council Directive 2004/101/, preamble, 2004 O.J. (L 338), 18, 18 [hereinafter 
Linking Directive]; Watanabe & Robinson, supra note 106, at 13.  
 108 See Linking Directive, supra note 107 (preamble). 
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marriage of sustainable development and market liberalism, even though the country 
seeking the marriage, the United States, had absconded.109 
 2.  Alternatives to Global Trading. - The EU, however, has not relied upon global 
trading as the sole means of meeting its Kyoto goals.110  The EU has established targets 
for increased use of renewable energy.111  Member countries have sought to achieve these 
targets primarily through two energy regulatory mechanisms, often coupled with some 
form of tax incentive.  Many countries (and many states in the United States) employ 
renewable energy portfolio standards that usually require electric utilities to obtain a 
fixed percentage of their energy from renewable sources.112  Typically, a renewable 
portfolio standard allows an electricity retailer to comply by using renewable energy from 
                                                 
 109 Accord Reimund Schwarze, Incentives to Adopt New Abatement Technology and US-
European Regulatory Cultures, in, EMISSIONS TRADING, supra note 55, at 58 (likening the EU to a hesitant 
bride expecting a baby after the father has left).  
 110 Mehling, supra note 104, at 121-22 (describing legislation on energy efficiency, 
renewable energy, energy taxation, funding and promotion schemes, voluntary agreements with industry, 
and monitoring of greenhouse gas emissions as following in the wake of a Europe Commission decision to 
make climate change a priority in 1992).  
 111 Commission of the European Communities, Commission Staff Working Document: The 
Share of Renewable Energy in the EU:  Country Profiles Overview of Renewable Energy Sources in the 
Enlarged European Union, SEC (2004) 547 (discussing EU target of a 12% share of renewable energy 
consumption by 2010); Commission of the European Communities, The Share of Renewable Energy in the 
EU:  Commission Report in Accordance with Article 3 of Directive 2001/77/EC, Evaluation of the Effect 
of Legislative Instruments and Other Community Policies on the Development of the Contribution of 
Renewable Energy Resources in the EU and Proposals for Concrete Actions, SEC(2004) 547, at 11 
[hereinafter 2004 Commission Energy Evaluation] (discussing an “indicative target” of 22% renewable 
electricity generation by 2010 for the EU 15). 
 112 Kevin S. Golden, Senate Bill 1078:  The Renewable Portfolio Standard:  California 
Asserts its Renewable Energy Leadership, 30 ECOLOGY L. Q. 693, 699 (2003) (describing renewable energy 
portfolio standards as requirements that “retail electricity sellers” include “a determined percentage of 
renewable energy sources” in their “resource portfolios.”); Barry G. Rabe, Race to the Top:  The 
Expanding Role of U.S. State Renewable Portfolio Standards 3-4 (2006) (listing states and countries that 
have adopted renewable portfolio standards); Andrew Ford et al., Stimulating Price Patterns for Tradable 
Green Certificates to Promote Electricity Generation from Wind, __ ENERGY POL’Y ___, ___ n. 4 (2006) 
(forthcoming) (describing state programs and mentioning the European countries employing similar 
programs); Commission of the European Communities, Communication from the Commission:  The 
Support of Electricity from Renewable Energy Sources, COM(2005) 627 at 4-5 [hereinafter Renewables 
Support] (listing countries employing green certificate systems, which can be a form of renewable portfolio 
standards); see also Espey, supra note 5, at 560 (explaining that the term renewable portfolio standard 
comes from U.S. practice, but that other countries employ different names to describe similar programs).  
See generally Nancy Rader & Scott Hempling, The Renewables Portfolio Standard:  A Practical Guide 
(2001). 
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a facility it owns, purchasing power from somebody else’s renewable energy facility, or 
by buying a renewable energy credit.113  In Europe, even more countries have used feed-
in tariffs, which require electricity providers to pay renewable energy providers a fixed 
above-market price for their energy.114  This approach relies on an economic incentive as 
a means of meeting a goal for technological change.  But it relies on a “distortion” of the 
“natural market” - basically government price fixing - to achieve sustainable 
development goals.115  Thus, Europe has employed both subsidies (a price mechanism) 
and production quotas (a quantity mechanism) to encourage renewable energy (as has the 
United States).116 
                                                 
 113 Golden, supra note 112, at 699-700.  Cf. Engel, supra note 5, at 268 n. 72 (only one state, 
Arizona, currently uses tradable renewable power credits); Ford et al., supra note 112, at __ (characterizing  
green certificates as quite new); Espey, supra note 5, at 557 (describing “certificates” as a means of proving 
compliance with a renewable portfolio standard).  Espey further explains that the certificate system allows 
a utility to participate in financing renewable energy without acquiring a production facility or obtaining 
the renewable power, for a utility can acquire a certificate without acquiring the underlying power.  Id. at 
560.  This separation can both simplify enforcement and provide flexibility for those complying with a 
renewables portfolio obligation.  See Rader & Hempling, supra note 112, at 55-71 (discussing trading’s 
potential uses).  While the green certificates have a number of advantages, the evidence suggests that the 
quotas themselves, not the trading, have spurred the technological development.  See, e.g., M.H. van der 
Linden et. al., Review of International Experience With Renewable Energy Obligations Support 
Mechanisms (LBNL-57666) at 49 (2005) (suppliers usually purchase tradable renewable energy credits 
from suppliers of renewable energy in order to meet their own compliance obligations); Ryan Wiser & Ole 
Langniss, The Renewables Portfolio standard in Texas:  An Early Assessment (2001), 
http://eetd.lbl.gov/EA/EMP 15 (stating that certificate trades “may not be essential” to effective design of a 
renewable portfolio standard). 
 114  Renewables Support, supra note 112, at 4 (most EU member states employ feed-in 
tariffs); Karen Palmer & Dallas Burtraw, Electricity, Renewables, and Climate Change:  Searching for a 
Cost-Effective Policy, 8-9 (2004), http://www.rff.org (discussing feed-in tariffs’ use in several European 
countries).  Feed-in tariffs constitute a subsidy and as such bear some similarity to the “Federal Production 
Tax” credit.  See Ford et al., supra note 112, at ___ n. 12. 
 115 See Renewable Energy Certificates System International, The Use of Guarantees of 
Origin 24 (2005), http://www.recs.org/doctree/RECS%20International/05%20Evaluation%20Report.pdf 
(explaining that a fixed feed-in tariff introduces a “market distortion.”)  
 116 See Lene Nielsen & Tim Jeppesen, Tradable Green Certificates in Selected European 
Countries_ Overview and Assessment, 31 ENERGY POL’Y 3, 5 (2003) (all countries planning green 
certificate program except the Netherlands “envisage . . . politically determined demand”); van der Linden 
et. al., supra note 132, at 11-12 (discussing feed-in tariffs, a tendering system where the government 
contracts for renewable power, financial incentives, and tax incentives); Palmer & Burtraw, supra note 114, 
at 3 (discussing state subsidies and funded by a surcharge on electricity purchases and federal renewable 
energy production tax credits).  See generally Wiener, supra note 43, at 706-713 (developing the distinction 
between price and quantity instruments with examples). 
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 The European Commission has also proposed shifting transport taxation to focus 
on carbon.117  While the European Parliament has not yet adopted this reform, several 
member states have employed relevant green taxes.118   
 This Article cannot catalogue all developed country efforts to meet Kyoto targets.  
But this brief description of a few key programs illustrates an important predicate for 
subsequent discussion, that most countries have combined global emissions trading with 
other more targeted approaches.        
III.  TECHNOLOGICAL CHOICES UNDER THE KYOTO PROTOCOL 
 Our Indian entrepreneur is not alone in making technological choices.  Other 
credit generators must decide between projects generating renewable energy (like the 
solar project), projects employing end-of-the-pipe approaches (like the HFC 23 project), 
and projects enhancing energy efficiency (which indirectly reduce carbon dioxide 
emissions).  Also, private actors make technological changes in responding to renewable 
portfolio standards and other measures aimed at stimulating greenhouse gas emission 
reductions.  What sorts of choices have people made under the Kyoto Protocol? 
A.  Technological Choices Generated by Global Emissions Trading 
 A survey of technological responses to the Kyoto Protocol’s project-based 
mechanisms suggests that those in our Indian entrepreneur’s position have made a variety 
                                                 
 117 Commission of the European Communities, Proposal for a Council Directive on 
Passenger Related Taxes, COM(2005)261 Final, at 7-8, available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/environment/co2/pdf/taxation_com_2005_261.pdf.  
 118 See David M. Driesen, Economic Instruments for Sustainable Development, in 
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW FOR SUSTAINABILITY:  A CRITICAL READER 295 (Stepan Wood, Benjamin J. 
Richardson eds. 2006) (discussing taxes touted as carbon taxes in several European countries); Choi, supra 
note 5, at 896-97 (discussing “green taxes” in the European energy sector).  
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of choices.  A quick glance at the projects list might suggest that renewable energy 
projects have dominated, since they constitute the majority of projects.119   
 But a more careful analysis suggests much more emphasis on end-of-the-pipe 
approaches than on renewable energy or energy efficiency.  End-of-the-pipe approaches 
have generated the lion’s share of credits available in the market.120  End-of-the-pipe 
technologies received most of the funding available for credit generating projects, with  
HFC control projects alone, like the project our  entrepreneur contemplated, garnering 
58% of the $2.5 billion invested in CDM projects in 2005.121 
 The chart below reflects the distribution of credits sold in 2005 and early 2006 
under the Kyoto Protocol’s project-based trading mechanisms (CDM and Joint 
Implementation).122  It shows end-of-the-pipe controls’ predominance and relatively little 
production of renewable energy 
                                                 
 119 Capoor & Ambrosi, supra note 7, at 33 (stating that 51% of the projects generating 
transactions have involved energy efficiency or renewable energy). 
 120 See Baumert, supra note 3, at 386 (noting that gas capture/destruction projects account 
for 66 percent of expected emission reduction credits).  
 121 See Robin Lancaster, Beyond All Expectation, 3 CARBON FIN. 15 (May 2006) (stating that 
HFC23 reductions accounted for 58% of the market volume between January 2005 and March 2006). 
 122 See Capoor & Ambrosi, supra note 7, at 9, 32-33 (explaining that the data comes from 
signed contracts and presenting figures from January of 2005 through March of 2006).  
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credits.123
 
If one examines somewhat less reliable numbers for projects “in the pipeline” (i.e. not yet 
fully-approved) for CDM only, renewable energy credits rise to about 17%.124  The 
                                                 
 123 I have derived this chart from the chart at the top of page 32 of the Capoor & Ambrosi 
report.  See Capoor & Ambrosi, supra note 7, at 32 (presenting more disaggregated data, including 
percentages of credits for different types of renewable energy sources).  On the next page of text, the 
Capoor & Ambrosi estimate that renewables and energy efficiency constitute 10% of the total by credits 
generated.  Id. at 33.  This suggests that some of the energy efficiency projects may be combined with 
renewable energy projects, since the chart shows 10% renewables and 2% efficiency projects, suggesting 
an aggregated total of 12%.  The “other” category in my chart denotes technologies that are not known to 
involve end-of-the-pipe, renewable efficiency, or energy efficiency technologies.  The “other” category  
includes some projects that might be properly viewed as “end-of-the-pipe” projects, so that the percentage 
of end-of-the-pipe credits may be understated.  The finding that renewables projects generate a small 
percentage of the total credits is broadly consistent with other analysts’ conclusions.  See, e.g., Ben 
Pearson, CDM  is Failing, 56 TIEMPO 12, 12 (2005), available at http://www.tiempocyberclimate.org/ 
portal/archive/pdf/tiempo56high.pdf (stating that renewables projects have generated just 11% of the total 
credits); CDM Watch, The World Bank and the Carbon Market:  Rhetoric and Reality, http://www. 
cdmwatch.org/files/World%20Bank%20paper%20final.pdf, at 16 (noting that renewables projects 
generated about 11% of CDM credits through April of 2005). 
 124 See Jane Ellis & Katia Karousakis, The Developing CDM Market:  May 2006 Update 6-7 
(2006), http://www.oecd.org/document/60/0,2340,en_2649_34361_1943164_1_1_1_1,00.html (discussing 
projects “in the pipeline” and then concluding that renewables are expected to generate 17% of the CDM 
credits).  This number represents a decline in the amount of renewable energy in the pipeline.  Id. at 7.  
Furthermore, renewables project developers may face greater risks than developers of cheaper projects of 
Distribution of Project Credits: 
Transactions from January 2005 to March 2006 
Renewables, 10%
Energy Efficiency, 2%
End-Of-The-Pipe, 61% 
Other, 27%
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Kyoto mechanisms have stimulated even less energy efficiency credits than renewable 
energy credits, since energy efficiency projects have generated just 2% of the total 
credits. 
 Sustainable development advocates have used the public participation provisions 
in project approval processes to oppose projects promising no additional carbon benefit 
and to address broader concerns about some projects’ collateral consequences for poor 
people in host countries.  For example, they have expressed concerns about ecological 
destruction and chemical contamination associated with a eucalyptus plantation 
generating carbon displacing biofuel and providing incentives to keep a landfill slated for 
closure open in order to allow methane capture for credit.125  The CDM Executive Board 
has sometimes revised or rejected emission estimates on the grounds that they exaggerate 
the carbon benefits or involve no additional carbon benefit from baseline conditions.126  
But public participation aimed at furthering sustainable development has not reversed the 
market trend favoring end-of-the-pipe control.127            
                                                                                                                                                 
having their projects emission credits disapproved or reduced.  See Lucy Mortimer, An Uncertain Path, 3 
CARBON FIN. 14 (April, 2006), available at http://www.carbon-financeonline.com (noting that many 
projects may not make it through the registration process because of financial problems, methodological 
problems, and uncertainty about the post-2012 carbon market); CDM Watch, supra note 123, at 16 (noting 
that many renewables projects may not meet the Kyoto Protocol’s “additionality” criterion).     
 125 See, e.g., Jim Vallette et al., A Wrong Turn from Rio:  The World Bank’s Road to 
Climate Change Catastrophe 9-10 (2004), http://www.seen.org (describing these projects and their effects); 
CDM Watch, supra note 123, at 11 (discussing a methane project in South Africa that might discourage the 
government from fulfilling its promise to close a landfill sited in a poor community under apartheid).  I am 
reporting here the sustainable development group’s characterization of the effects, which I have not 
independently evaluated.  Cf. The World Bank Carbon Finance Unit, Brazil:  Plantar Sequestration and 
Biomass Use (2006), http://carbonfinance.org/Router.cfm?Page=Projport&ProjID=9600#DocsList 
(suggesting that the Plantar project will lessen ecological destruction).  The point here is not to determine 
who is right about project disputes, but simply to characterize the types of concerns that come up in public 
comment processes on CDM projects. 
 126 See, e.g., CDM Watch, supra note 123, at 23-25 (describing the reasons for rejection of 
some CDM projects).  
 127 Cf. U.N. Conference on Environment and Development, Agenda 21, U.N. Doc. 
A/CONF.151.26 ¶ 9.9 (1992) (calling for renewable energy in a document providing a blueprint for 
sustainable development); David M. Driesen, Air Pollution, in STUMBLING, supra note 48, at 257-261. 
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B.  Technological Choices Under More Targeted Programs 
 By contrast with global trading’s emphasis on end-of-the-pipe strategies, more 
targeted regulatory programs have increased the use of renewable energy and energy 
efficiency.128  On the renewables front, they have catalyzed an enormous increase in wind 
power.129  The technological development that these programs have encouraged has 
caused a drop in price, which has made wind power a cost effective energy source.130  
Photovoltaic module production for solar energy has also increased markedly in Europe, 
but biomass energy has increased more modestly.131  And the prices for solar and 
biomass technologies have dropped over time, although usually not to levels that make 
them cost competitive with heavily subsidized fossil fuels.132     
                                                                                                                                                 
(discussing Agenda 21’s provisions favoring renewable energy and energy efficiency as part of sustainable 
development). 
 128 See, e.g., Van der Linden et al., supra note 113, at 38 (suggesting that a number of policy 
instruments have contributed to increased renewable energy production in Sweden); James W. Moeller, Of 
Credits and Quotas:  Federal Tax Incentives for Renewable Resources, State Renewable Portfolio 
Standards, and the Evolution of Proposals for a Federal Renewable Portfolio Standard, 15 FORDHAM 
ENVTL. L. J. 69, 73-77 (2004) (explaining that a federal requirement that electric utilities purchase power 
from renewable energy sources played a “significant role” in expanding renewable power generation); cf. 
Choi, supra note 5, at 891 n. 86 (claiming that the acid rain program has discouraged use of renewable 
energy, in spite of the establishment of reserve allowances to provide incentives to use it). 
 129 See Frederic C. Menz & Stephan Vacon, The Effectiveness of Different Policy Regimes 
for Promoting Wind Power:  Experiences from the States, 34 ENERGY POL’Y 1786 (2006) (finding that 
renewable portfolio standards have stimulated increased production of wind power); 2004 Commission 
Energy Evaluation supra note 111, at 19 (finding noting that wind power grew by 23% in 2003, exceeding 
EU wind target); see also Ford et al., supra note 112, at ___ n. 4 (explaining that the Texas renewable 
portfolio standard produced the “Texas Wind Rush,” the installation of 10 new wind projects in 2001 
producing 930 megawatts of power). 
 130 Jeffrey Greenblatt et al., Baseload Wind Energy:  Modeling Competition Between Gas 
Turbines and Compressed air Energy Storage for Supplemental Generation, __ ENERGY POL’Y ___,  ___ 
(2006) (forthcoming) (attributing a 30% annual increase in installed wind capacity to a “twofold drop in 
capital costs between 1992 and 2001” and “government initiatives.”); 2004 Commission Energy 
Evaluation, supra note 111, at 19 (finding that wind costs have fallen by 50% over the last 15 years).  
 131 See 2004 Commission Energy Evaluation, supra note 111, at 20-21.  
 132 See Mona Hymei, The United States Experience with Energy-Based Tax Incentives:  The 
Evidence Supporting Tax Incentives for Renewable Energy, Arizona Legal Studies Discussion Paper No. 
06-21 (2006), http://www.ssrn.com/abstract=896987 (discussing United States subsidies for fossil fuels and 
renewable energy); Bert Metz & Detlef van Vuuren, How, and at What Costs, can Low-Level Stabilization 
be Achieved?- An Overview, in AVOIDING DANGEROUS CLIMATE CHANGE 339 (Hans Joachim Schellnhuber 
et al. eds. (2006)) [hereinafter DANGEROUS] (noting that renewable energy today represent one of the most 
expensive options for greenhouse gas mitigation); Bernardo Barreto & Socrates Kypreos, Emissions 
Trading and Technology Deployment in an Energy-Systems “Bottom-up” Model with Technology 
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  We have also seen an obvious innovation in vehicle technology, as many 
companies have begun offering hybrid vehicles that reduce reliance on gasoline, using a 
battery’s electricity to help power the vehicle.  These vehicles typically offer increased 
energy efficiency and reduced carbon dioxide emissions.133  Manufacturers have 
introduced hybrids in order to comply with California regulations requiring Low 
Emission Vehicles (LEV).134  These regulations at their core involve a performance 
standard, which is sufficiently stringent to make it very difficult to rely on conventional 
technology as a compliance method.  The LEV regulations, however, generally permit 
each manufacturer to average its vehicles’ emissions to meet the standards.135  This fleet-
average approach represents a limited use of the trading concept, since it does not allow 
credits from non-vehicle emission reductions to count toward meeting the LEV 
obligation.136   
 California has very recently adopted regulations directly limiting carbon 
emissions from vehicles sold in that state.137  And China has promulgated ambitious 
energy efficiency requirements for vehicles.138  These standards, not the Kyoto 
mechanisms, seem the most likely drivers of meaningful technological change in the 
motor vehicle industry.           
                                                                                                                                                 
Learning, 158 EUR. J. OPERATIONAL RES. 243, 246-48 (2004) (estimating an 86% progress ratio for solar 
photovoltaics, representing the rate of cost decline per doubling of production).  
 133 See Plugging Into the Future, THE ECONOMIST 30 (June 10, 2006) (discussing the fuel 
efficiency gains of the Toyota Prius and other hybrid vehicles). 
 134 CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 13 § 1960.1 (2006).  
 135 See Motor Vehicles Mfrs. Ass’n, v. N.Y. State Dep’t of Envtl. Conservation 17 F.3d 521, 
528 (2d Cir. 1994) (describing the fleet average approach), on remand, 869 F. Supp. 1012 (N.D.N.Y. 
1994), aff’d, 79 F.2d 1298 (2d Cir. 1996).  
 136 See Keeth, supra note 102, at 726-27 (explaining how manufacturers can comply with 
averaging requirements that relaxed the technological demands in the original program’s zero emission 
vehicle requirement). 
 137 CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 13 § 1961.1(a)-(g) (2006).  
 138 See Keith Bradsher & David Barboza, Pollution from Chinese Coal Casts a Long Global 
Shadow, N.Y. TIMES A1,  A12 (June 11, 2006) (noting that vehicles sold in China must meet stricter fuel 
efficiency standards than those of the United States). 
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 Traditional regulations and demand-side management programs have increased 
energy efficiency.139  In the United States, for example, energy efficiency standards for 
appliances have enormously decreased electricity use and associated carbon dioxide 
emissions even as appliances have grown in size and their features have improved.140  
Demand-side management programs implemented by European governments and state 
utility regulators in the United States require electric utilities to choose the most cost 
effective approach to matching supply and demand.141  Demand reducing investments in 
energy efficiency generally cost less than supply increasing investments in energy 
production, so utility demand size management programs have required investments in 
energy efficiency.142   
 Thus, the data suggest that the Kyoto trading mechanisms have primarily 
encouraged cheap end-of-the-pipe technologies, which do not significantly change 
prevailing development patterns.143  On the other hand, some targeted regulatory 
programs have produced more fundamental technological changes.  For a decision to 
deploy solar power or another renewable energy source in lieu of burning coal changes 
the fundamental choice about which fuel to use in producing energy.  And energy 
efficiency improvements reduce energy consumption, thereby reducing demand for more 
energy production, the fundamental driver of climate change.              
                                                 
 139 David S. Loughran & Jonathan Kulick, Demand-Side Management and Energy Efficiency 
in the United States, 25 ENERGY J. 19, 34 (2004) (utilities reported 180,000 M Wh annual energy efficiency 
savings from demand-side management between 1989 and 1999).  
 140 See Robert R. Nordhaus & Kyle W. Danish, Assessing the Options for Designing a 
Mandatory U. S. Greenhouse Gas Reduction Program, 32 B. C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 97, 107 (2005) 
(DOE’s appliance efficiency program has produced roughly an annual one quad reduction in energy use).  
 141 See Ralph Cavanagh, Least Cost Planning Imperatives for Utilities and Their Regulators, 
10 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 299 (1996) (justifying such a comparison, explaining how to carry it out, and 
surveying state programs).  
 142 See Loughran & Kulick, supra note 139, at 25 (showing that generating  a kilowatt hour 
costs more than twice as much as saving a kilowatt hour through energy efficiency).  
 143 Cf. Choi, supra note 5, at 951 (arguing that “addressing global climate change requires 
fundamental changes in human behavior”).   
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IV.  ON THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT  
AND MARKET LIBERALISM 
 
 Our person in India and others like her have been choosing traditional end-of-the-
pipe technologies as the principal means of earning carbon credits.  This result will 
surprise many readers of the instrument choice literature.  For that literature generally 
associates “end-of-the-pipe” technology with high cost “command and control” 
regulation and links emissions trading to innovation and pollution prevention.144 
   This part returns to the question of which technology our entrepreneur should 
choose.  It argues that positive spillovers make technological innovation very important 
to sustainable development, but that carbon markets and emissions trading markets in 
general, do not adequately take spillovers into account.  It then presents a theory 
explaining why global trading may not encourage renewable energy as well as more 
targeted government programs.  Finally, this part draws lessons from emissions trading’s 
neglect of positive spillovers for the relationship between sustainable development and 
market liberalism.    
 A.  Is Expensive Innovation Desirable?:   
 Spillovers and Sustainable Development 
 
 Even if our entrepreneur would choose a cheap command and control technique 
over a more innovative solar energy technology, we might not regard trading’s favoring 
of that choice as proof of a conflict between market liberalism and sustainable 
development.  If we employ soft versions of both market liberalism and sustainable 
                                                 
 144 See, e.g., Richard B. Stewart, Environmental Regulation:  A Failing Paradigm, 15 J.L. & 
COM. 585, 592 (1996) (contrasting the “existing technology-based system[’s]” emphasis on “end-of-pipe” 
controls with trading’s encouragement of “process changes and conservation”); Richard B. Stewart, 
Controlling Environmental Risks Through Economic Incentives, 13 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 153, 155, 166 
(1988) (technology-based regulation requires installation of “pollution control” technology, while 
“economic incentives” encourage “new products or production technologies”).   
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development we can rationalize a comfortable marriage using the trading approach.  As 
already suggested, soft market liberalism accepts some role for government regulation, 
especially when it uses economic incentives.  A soft version of sustainable development 
would demand nothing more than some actions addressing environmental problems with 
significant future consequences.  In that case, the choice to control HFC combines cost 
effective market liberalism with sustainable development, since the choice cost 
effectively realizes a real reduction in greenhouse gas emissions.  On the other hand, if 
we give greater weight to future generations’ interests, we may find sustainable 
development and market liberalism in some tension, even in the emissions trading 
realm.145  
 1.  Why Technological Innovation is Important to Sustainable Development- 
 Technological innovation, including expensive innovation, is crucial to efforts to 
protect future generations’ interest.  For that reason, both Agenda 21, an international 
agreement sometimes described as sustainable development’s blueprint, and the 
Brundtland Report emphasize the needs for renewable energy, like the solar project our 
entrepreneur considered.146  
  This idea of a key role for technological innovation in sustainable development 
focuses significant attention upon choices about “economic development” itself, which 
includes fundamental choices about how to produce goods and services.  The economist 
                                                 
 145 See Michaelowa & Butzengeiger, supra note 88, at 3 (suggesting that renewables policies 
might be justified without carbon benefits because of falling costs over time) with Jos Sijm, The Interaction 
Between the EU Emissions Trading Scheme and National Energy Policy, 5 CLIMATE POL’Y 79, 94 (2005) 
(suggesting that energy security , equity, “raising fiscal resources,” ancillary environmental benefits, and 
dynamic efficiency may justify energy policy, but that allowance trading makes it unnecessary for carbon 
reduction purposes).  
 146 U.N. Conference on Environment and Development, Agenda 21, U.N. Doc. 
A/CONF.151.26 ¶ 9.9 (1992) (calling for increased use of renewable energy and energy efficiency); 
WCED, supra note 9, at 188 (calling for giving the “highest priority” to the development of renewable 
energy).  
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Herman Daly has argued that sustainable development should aim to reduce, or at least 
stabilize, “through-put” - the use of natural resources and inputs and waste streams as 
output.147  He opposes economic growth defined in terms of increased throughput, 
because he finds such growth unsustainable.148  He favors, however, economic 
development, which he defines as improvements of living standards that come without 
increased through-put.149  This vision seems to require changes, such as increased use of 
solar power, that enable us to produce goods and services without consuming non-
renewable fossil fuels and generating excessive waste.  Making changes that allow for 
economic development without using up non-renewable resources requires significant 
technological innovation.150   
 We need not go as far as Daly would to find that protection of future generations 
in the climate change context requires significant innovation in how the world produces 
and uses energy.  Indeed, climate change experts seem to agree that seriously addressing 
climate change requires significant changes in energy production and use.151  No scientist 
(and for that matter, no well-informed policy-maker) believes that Kyoto’s contemplated 
5% cut in developed country emissions meets the Framework Convention’s goal of 
avoiding dangerous climate change.  The countries ratifying the Kyoto Protocol saw it as 
                                                 
 147 Id. at 271. 
 148 Id. at 267-68. 
 149 Id. at 268.  
 150 See  DRIESEN, supra note  148, at 89 (explaining the link between Daly’s idea of reduced 
throughput and technological innovation)  
 151 Interview with Lewis Milford, Clean Air Group, Clean Energy Group (July 5, 2005) 
(claiming that experts agree that the world needs significant innovation in how energy is produced to 
adequately address climate change).  See, e.g., DESSLER & PARSON, supra note 1, at 102-106 (discussing 
technological options to address climate change with emphasis on options involving significant 
technological changes); Baumert, supra note 3, at 388 (stating that effectively addressing climate change 
requires “large-scale technological and behavioral changes.”).    
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a first step toward seriously addressing this goal.152  Recently, several climate scientists 
have attempted to estimate the amount of carbon dioxide reductions needed to avoid 
some of climate change’s key dangers.  While estimates vary, they envision cuts on the 
order of 50% below global 1990 levels by the year 2050.153  Since the world’s most 
populous countries, China and India, are currently building new coal-fired power plants 
to service their rapidly industrializing countries, realizing such sizable cuts will require 
dramatic changes in how the world produces and uses energy.154  Hence, technological 
choices under the Kyoto Protocol advance sustainable development when they contribute 
to making more ambitious future goals feasible.     
 A moderate version of inter-generational sustainability might not countenance the 
damage to future generations that a failure to produce this drastic reduction would cause.  
For scientists predict that the sea level rise associated with a 3°C increase in global 
temperatures, an increase well within the range scientists expect, would inundate most of 
Manhattan, significant portions of heavily populated areas in Bangladesh, and almost all 
of Florida; completely destroy several island states; and put other very populous regions 
underwater as well.155  From the standpoint of sustainable development, a technological 
                                                 
 152 KOLBERT, supra note 72, at 166.  
 153 See DESSLER & PARSON, supra note 1, at 155-158 (suggesting that avoiding a 3 °C 
temperature rise may require a 40% cut from 2010 levels by 2050 and more than a 60% cut by 2100); 
James E. Hansen, A Slippery Slope:  How Much Global Warming Constitutes “Dangerous Anthropogenic 
Interference, 68 CLIMATE CHANGE 269, 277 (2005) (stating that a 2°C temperature rise “almost surely takes 
us well into the realm of dangerous” climate change); Malte Meinshausen, What Does a 2°C Target Mean 
for Greenhouse Gas Concentrations?  A Brief Analysis Based on Multi-Gas Emission Pathways and 
Several Climate Sensitivity Uncertainty Estimates, in AVOIDING DANGEROUS CLIMATE CHANGE, supra note 
132, at 269-70 (estimating that limiting temperature rise to less than 2°C likely requires a 55% reduction 
below 1990 emission levels by 2050). 
 154 See Bradsher & Barboza, supra note 138 (explaining that Chinese coal-fired power plants 
will probably increase greenhouse gas emissions by 5 times the amount of cuts from Kyoto and that India is 
following suit). 
 155 See James E. Hansen, Global Warming:  Is There Still Time to Avoid Disastrous Human-
Made Climate Change?  i.e. Have We Passed a Tipping Point? 26-29 (2006), http://www.columbia.edu 
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change that contributes to a process of technological development leading, in the long 
term, to significant fossil fuel displacement has much more value than deployment of a 
conventional technology that contributes nothing to this long-term process.156  The 
cutting edge technology offers more protection to future generations, even if both, in the 
short term, deliver equivalent direct greenhouse gas emission reductions. 
 2.  Positive Spillovers’ Importance -  The economic concept of a spillover helps 
explains innovation’s value.  Economists have long recognized that firms and individuals 
under-invest in innovation for several reasons.  First, undertaking innovation often 
involves substantial expense with an uncertain payoff.157  Second, potential innovators 
tend to under invest in technological change because the innovating firm cannot capture 
all of an innovation’s positive benefits.158  When somebody advances the state of an art, 
these advances often fuel positive “spillovers,” namely other advances by competing 
firms not generating rents for the original innovator.159   
 Patent law allows innovators to keep some of the rents from innovation in order to 
address markets’ failures to adequately stimulate innovation.160  At the same time, patent 
law (and intellectual property law generally) recognizes positive spillovers’ value and 
seeks to encourage realization of spillovers’ benefits by allowing some open access to 
                                                                                                                                                 
/~jeh1/nas_24april2006.pdf (providing maps of areas that would probably be under water if temperature 
increased by 3° C).  
 156 See generally Choi, supra note 5, at 872 (claiming that development of renewable energy 
and increased energy efficiency can move the world toward sustainable development).  
 157 See POSNER, supra note 16, at 123 (commenting that uncertainty lies at the “core” of 
technological innovation, because “scientific progress is unpredictable.”). 
 158 See ID. at 123-24 (third parties’ ability to use information makes it difficult for inventors 
to keep all the value their inventions create); Gregory N. Mandel, Promoting Environmental Innovation 
and Intellectual Property Innovation:  A New Basis for Patent Rewards, 24 TEMPLE J. ENVTL. L. & TECH. 
51, 56 (2006) (if a person “builds a better mousetrap,” others may copy it).   
 159 See  Mark A. Lemley & Brett Frischman, Spillovers, ___ COLUM. L. REV. __ , ___ (2006) 
(forthcoming).  
 160 Id. at ___ (explaining that intellectual property law allows innovators to capture some, 
but “not all,” of the value from innovations).  
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information embedded in intellectual property.161  In exchange for a patent giving 
innovator a monopoly in an invention’s production, the patent law requires publication of 
the patent, which discloses to competitors details about the invention’s design.162  This 
facilitates other firms’ efforts to build on the advances justifying the patent.163  Other 
intellectual property law features, limits on the term of property rights, the lack of 
property rights in ideas and facts, and allowance for fair use of copyrighted material also 
reflect recognition of positive spillovers’ value.164     
 Positive spillovers from technological choices in addressing climate change (or 
other long-term environmental problems) play a vital role in advancing sustainable 
development.  An advance in solar energy technology, for example, may fuel other 
advances increasing solar energy’s utility (perhaps for cloudy climates) or lowering its 
future costs.165   Increasing the utility of renewable energy makes it a more viable 
substitute for fossil fuels exacerbating global warming, thus making an important long-
term contribution to addressing global warming above and beyond the carbon reduction 
associated with a particular renewable energy project’s relatively direct carbon reduction 
benefits.166             
 Facilitation of long-term switches from fossil fuels not only helps protect future 
generations from climate change’s environmental and economic harms, but avoids more 
                                                 
 161 Id. at ___, ___ (explaining that both copyright and patent law create a “semicommons” 
combining private property rights and commons elements).  
 162 Id. ___ (explaining that patent law “requires the patent owner to teach the public how to 
make and use the invention”).  
 163 Id.  
 164 See id. at __-___ (explaining why these features and others promote positive spillovers).    
 165 See generally, Steffen Kallbekken & Nathan Rive, Why Delaying Emission Cuts is a 
Gamble, in AVOIDING DANGEROUS CLIMATE CHANGE, supra note 132, at 315 (explaining that 
technological change can influence pollution abatement’s cost and feasibility). 
166          See Eban Goodstein, Prices Versus Policy:  Which Path to Clean Technology, in THE 
LONG-TERM ECONOMICS OF CLIMATE CHANGE:  BEYOND A DOUBLING OF GREENHOUSE GAS 
CONCENTRATIONS 225 (Darwin C. Hall & Richard B. Howarth eds. 2001) (identifying early investment in 
clean technology with avoidance of “ongoing residual damage from carbon emissions”).    
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direct economic problems associated with fossil fuel use.  Fossil fuels cannot supply 
energy indefinitely and may prove very costly over time.  Because fossil fuel resources 
are finite, their price will eventually rise.167   Current investment in alternatives to fossil 
fuels reduces the cost of making these switches later with less technological history168 
and also avoids potential supply shortages during a transition.  Switching before fossil 
fuels run out or become scarce reduces the economic damage and environmental harms 
future generations will suffer.    
 In addition to these long-term positive spillovers, renewable energy generates 
near term positive spillovers.  For example, selection of solar power as a method of 
reducing carbon will also reduce emissions of conventional air pollution.169  These 
conventional pollutants have made big contributions’ to many developing countries’ 
failure to provide a healthful life for their people, i.e. to meet the current generation’s 
needs.170  Thus, positive spillovers can serve sustainable development not only by 
advancing future generations’ interests, but also by better meeting the current 
generations’ basic needs.   
                                                 
 167 Cf. Choi, supra note 5, at 951 (claiming that recent crude oil prices indicate that “fossil 
fuels have already begun to be in short supply.”).  
 168 See id. at 233 (explaining in detail why earlier investment in clean technology reduces 
costs).  
169          See Luis Mundaca & Hakan Rodhe, CDM Wind-Energy Projects:  Exploring Small 
Capacity Thresholds and Low Performances, 4 CLIMATE POL’Y 399, 405 (2005) (wind energy reduces 
harmful sulfur dioxide emissions to zero); Douglas A. Kysar, Some Realism About Environmental 
Skepticism:  The Implications of Bjorn Lomborg’s `The Skeptical Environmentalist’ for Environmental Law 
and Policy, 30 ECOLOGY L. Q. 223, 263 (2003) (noting incidental reductions in sulfur dioxide, nitrogen 
oxides, volatile organic compounds, and particulates).  
170        See UNCED, Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, princ. 1, U.N. Doc. 
A/CONF.151/26, Annex I (1992) (recognizing a human right to a “healthy life” based on the centrality of 
human beings to sustainable development). 
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 If our entrepreneur’s solar energy project generates sufficiently valuable positive 
spillovers, then our entrepreneur should invest in the solar option.171  While a calculus 
based only on least cost carbon reductions directly associated with current projects favors 
HFC 23, a broader consideration of positive spillovers and sustainable development may 
favor the more expensive carbon abatement choice.   
 3.  Valuable Innovation May Prove Initially Expensive - The adage “you get what 
you pay for” suggests that often technological choices producing significant positive 
spillovers will prove initially expensive. While our entrepreneur’s choice offers but one 
example of the tradeoff between near term cost effectiveness (narrowly defined) and 
realization of positive spillovers’ benefits, this tradeoff may be quite widespread.   Solar 
energy constitutes a high quality environmental product offering a significant array of 
advantages not just a cheap fix to a single problem.   These advantages include avoidance 
of a variety of forms of conventional air pollution, enhanced energy security, and 
avoidance of environmental damages associated with extracting fossil fuels from the 
earth.  This high quality product, however, commands a price that reflects significant 
research and development costs that often are needed to develop major technological 
advances, as one might expect.  Cars, computers, and many other products stem from 
technological advances that produced expensive luxury goods that ultimately become 
cheap enough to enjoy a mass market.  It is likely that some crucial innovation significant 
enough to make a major difference for a serious long-term environmental challenge like 
global warming while simultaneously addressing other environmental and developmental 
                                                 
 171 See generally Palmer & Burtraw, supra note 114, at 62 (“providing a jump start to 
technology learning” can yield significant future benefits).  
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needs will prove initially expensive.  Certainly, renewable energy seems to conform to 
the model of an initially expensive good offering high quality.       
 High short-term costs do not, however, necessarily imply high long-term costs.  
Today’s expensive technology can become tomorrow’s cheap routine way of offering a 
better life.  Economists studying innovation have noticed that firms learn from the 
experience of manufacturing new products and that this learning by doing can lower costs 
and improve product quality over time in unpredictable ways.172  Learning seems to have 
occurred in the case of renewable energy, even with rather modest use of it, for 
renewable energy’s price has generally fallen over time.173  The tendency of firms to 
learn from efforts to make products implies that choosing environmental instruments that 
encourage expensive innovation can provide experience lowering long-term costs.   
 The solar example illustrates another feature of the tension between long-term and 
short-term costs.  Solar energy requires an expensive capital investment, but no fuel 
costs.  This means that as time goes on, the total costs can become cheaper than that of an 
approach like fossil fuel generation, which generates fuel costs year after year, costs that 
will rise when fossil fuel becomes scarce.174  Hence, expensive innovation may have high 
                                                 
 172 See Patrick Matschoss & Heinz Welsch, International Emissions Trading and Induced 
Carbon-Saving Technological Change:  Effects of Restricting the Trade in Carbon Rights, 33 ENVTL. & 
RESOURCE ECON. 169, 172 (2006) (associating learning by doing with assuming that learning comes from 
production); Barreto & Kypreos, supra note 132, at 245-46 (“learning . . . plays an important role” in 
improving technologies’ cost and performance).   
 173 See Michaelowa & Butzengeiger, supra note 88, at 3 (most forms of renewable energy 
are “undergoing a strong cost decrease”); Palmer & Burtraw, supra note 114, at 17, 51-52 (explaining that 
the potential for learning by doing is high for renewable energy); Leo Schrattenholzer, Experience Curves 
of Photovoltaic Technologies 3 (2000), http://www.iiasa.ac.at/Publications/Documents/IR-00-014.pdf 
(photovoltaic modules experienced a 20% cost decline with each doubling of installed capacity on 
average). 
174         Cf. DRIESEN, supra note 34, at 83-85 (providing a numerical example to illustrate how 
long term and short term costs may diverge) 
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value and low long-term costs, which should make it highly desirable from a long-term 
perspective. 
 The neoliberal perspective tends to deny the value of initially expensive 
innovation through the technique of discounting future costs (and benefits).175  Because 
current technological improvement’s costs occur today and many of the benefits accrue 
far in the future, reliance on discounting tends to produce analysis disapproving of 
significant near term efforts to protect future generations (like the employment of solar 
energy).176  Economists favor the discounting approach because it reflects the observed 
preferences of market participants, who tend to value current costs (and benefits) more 
highly than future costs (and benefits).177  But sustainable development proponents tend 
to treat this preference for short-sightedness as a problem to be overcome, not something 
to institutionalize in formal CBA.178  Hence, neoliberals and sustainable development 
                                                 
 175 See generally Kysar, supra note 169, at 266 (stating that economic models used to 
estimate the costs and benefits of mitigating climate change “use a mathematical discount rate . . . to 
significantly reduce” future harms’ value); Richard L. Revesz, Environmental Regulation, Cost-Benefit 
Analysis, and the Discounting of Human Lives, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 941 (1999); Kenneth Arrow et al., 
Intertemporal Equity, Discounting, and Economic Efficiency, in CLIMATE CHANGE 1995:  ECONOMIC AND 
SOCIAL DIMENSIONS OF CLIMATE CHANGE 125 (James P. Bruce et al. eds. 1996). 
 176 See POSNER, supra note 16, at 151-52 (recognizing that application of a discount rate 
tends to “obliterate” future generations’ interests in contexts like that of global warming, because the 
discounting drastically reduces valuation of future harms).  
 177 See John L. Donohue, Why We Should Discount The Views of Those Who Discount 
Discounting, 108 YALE L. J. 1901, 1905 (1999) (a person would prefer saving ten lives today over saving 
ten lives seven years from now).  
 178 See, e.g., Kysar, supra note 169, at 266-67 (questioning the “moral basis” for discounting 
human lives saved and other future benefits of climate change policies); Douglas A. Kysar, Climate 
Change, Cultural Transformation, and Comprehensive Rationality, 31 B. C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 555, 578-
585 (2004) (discussing discounting’s moral issues in the climate change context); David A. Dana, A 
Behavioral Economic Defense of the Precautionary Principle, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 1315 (2003) (defending 
the precautionary principle as a means of correcting for cognitive bias favoring short term cost avoidance 
over long-term risk avoidance);  see also Lisa Heinzerling, Discounting Life, 108 YALE L. J. 1911 (1999); 
Daniel A. Farber & Paul A. Hemmersbaugh, The Shadow of the Future:  Discount Rates, Later 
Generations, and the Environment, 46 VAND. L. REV. 267 (1993); Edith Brown Weiss, The Planetary 
Trust:  Conservation and Intergenerational Equity, 11 ECOLOGY L. Q. 495 (1984).   See generally Kysar, 
supra note 8, at 2134 (noting that sustainable development proponents do not accept existing preferences as 
immutable).  
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advocates diverge, to some degree, in how much value they attach to positive spillovers 
generating future benefits.        
 B.  Why Global Emissions Trading Does Not Favor Expensive Innovation 
 Carbon markets encourage people like our entrepreneur to “internalize” some of 
the value of carbon savings from environmental projects.  In this, they resemble pollution 
conventional performance standards and pollution taxes aimed at carbon, both of which 
would also add a price to goods and services reflecting costs associated with global 
warming and create incentives to reduce emissions.  This section focuses on the question 
of whether global carbon markets tend to stimulate expensive innovations as a major 
means of realizing carbon reduction benefits.   
 I make a weak and a strong claim regarding carbon markets and innovation.  The 
weak claim is simply that global carbon trading markets do not systematically remedy the 
underinvestment in innovation that spillover analysis reveals.  The strong claim is that a 
global trading program stimulates expensive innovation more weakly than a performance 
standard of identical stringency.   
 1.  Global Emissions Trading’s Failure to Remedy Spillover Neglect - Rational 
actors in the carbon markets will take direct carbon benefits into account as they choose 
projects, but they will not necessarily take into account projects’ positive spillovers.  And 
these spillovers will vary.  For example, the HFC project seems to offer no long-term 
technological development prospects (owing to the phase out of the production process to 
which it is attached) and no collateral environmental benefits.  Still, our Indian 
entrepreneur may not choose the solar project, because she receives no economic benefit 
from competitors building upon lessons learned from her solar installation or from 
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lowered conventional pollution associated with her choice.  This failure of global trading 
markets to encourage rational actors to take positive spillovers into account, means, at a 
minimum, that emissions trading provides no panacea for the problem of insufficient 
investment in environmental innovation.   
 By contrast, targeted renewable energy programs have a specific goal of 
stimulating sufficient investment in renewables.  By either requiring deployment of 
renewable energy or offering a high tariff for it, they pay for long-term economic 
development.  Indeed, they do this precisely because of recognition of some of the 
broader non-carbon benefits of renewables, such as long-term technological 
development, heightened energy security, and reductions in conventional pollution.179  
Thus, items that appear as spillovers, not internalized in carbon markets, become 
rationales for expenditures aiding sustainable development in targeted energy programs.  
This suggests that targeted programs may provide superior incentives for relatively 
expensive innovation than trading programs. 
 2.  Global Trading Programs Provide Weaker Incentives for Expensive 
Innovation than Performance Standards of Identical Stringency -    Indeed, for any given  
 
level of stringency, a global emissions trading program offers a weaker incentives for 
expensive innovation than a performance standard of identical stringency.  Emissions 
trading proponents have claimed that trading provides stronger incentives for innovation 
than traditional regulation.180  I confine my contrary claim of global trading’s inferiority 
                                                 
179           See Marc Ringel, Fostering the Use of Renewable Energies in the European Union:  The 
Race Between Feed-in Tariffs and Green Certificates, 31 RENEWABLE ENERGY 1, 4-5 (2006) (discussing 
these factors as aims of EU policy on renewables).  
 180 See, e.g., ENVIRONMENTAL LAW, supra note 17, at 19 (stating that “economic incentive 
systems,” including emissions trading, have an advantage over command and control regulation in 
stimulating “continuing innovation.”); Robert N. Stavins, Policy Instruments in for Global Climate 
Change:  How Can Government Address a Global Problem?, 1997 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 293, 302-03; Robert 
W. Hahn and Robert N. Stavins, Incentive-Based Environmental Regulation:  A New Era for an Old Idea, 
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to relatively expensive innovation.  Furthermore, I do not argue that trading is incapable 
of stimulating expensive innovation if sufficiently stringent.  I only argue that for any 
given level of stringency, e.g. a given carbon reduction target, a performance standard 
creates better incentives for expensive innovation than a trading program.  My claim 
implies that emissions trading loses important positive spillovers.     
 The conventional claim that trading encourages innovation better than traditional 
regulation generally relies upon the observation that emissions trading, unlike traditional 
regulation, encourages polluters to go beyond compliance.181  This suggests that an 
emissions trading program would provide a better incentive for innovation than a 
traditional regulation implementing the same underlying emission limit.   
 This analysis, however, focuses on credit sellers alone and ignores buyers.182  
Credit buyers face weaker incentives to innovate under a trading program than they 
would face under a performance standard of identical stringency that does not allow for 
trades.183  Those who buy credits would do so because they face relatively high control 
costs.  Trading allows buyers to escape from implementing expensive control measures at 
their own facilities.  Without trading, however, they would face significant incentives to 
innovate, as innovation would provide the only way of escaping a conventional 
                                                                                                                                                 
18 ECOLOGY L. Q. 1, 13 (1991); Bruce A. Ackerman & Richard B. Stewart, Reforming Environmental Law:  
The Democratic Case for Market Incentives, 13 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 217, 234-35 (1988); Stewart, supra 
note 144, at 160. 
 181 Adam B. Jaffe et al., Environmental Policy and Technological Change, 22 ENVTL. & 
RESOURCE ECON. 41, 51 (2002) (economic incentives stimulate innovation by paying firms to clean up “a 
bit more.”); David A. Malueg, Emissions Credit Trading and the Incentive to Adopt New Pollution 
Abatement Technology, 16 J. ENVTL. ECON. & MGMT. 52, at 8-9 & n. 33 (1987).  
 182 See David M. Driesen, Design, Trading, and Innovation, in MOVING TO MARKETS, supra 
note 55, at 434-35 (explaining how the traditional focus on sellers biases theory).  
 183 Barreto & Kypreos, supra note 132, at 259 (finding that trading hinders the development 
and deployment of low carbon technology in permit buying regions).  
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approach’s high control costs.  Thus trading provides inferior innovation incentives for 
owners of half of the sources in a perfect trading market.   
 Precise analysis of trading’s impact on innovation requires us to ask the following 
question:  Does trading shifting emission reductions from high cost to low-cost facilities 
provides better net incentives for innovation than those an identical performance standard 
would provide if regulators allowed no trading?184  A growing numbers of economists 
have questioned the claim that emissions trading always provides superior incentives for 
innovation.185  And a recent detailed empirical analysis of sulfur dioxide controls in the 
utility industry argues that more innovation occurred under the command-and-control 
regime in place prior to 1990 than under the more recent acid rain trading program.186  
The acid rain program, emissions trading’s poster child, generally encouraged 
inexpensive but traditional compliance strategies, namely use of scrubbers and low sulfur 
coal.187  
                                                 
 184 See Driesen, supra note 182, at 433-34 (presenting and defending this analytical 
framework); Schwarze, supra note 109, at 56-57 (recognizing that a “fair comparison” between trading and 
traditional regulation requires “the same standard”). 
 185 See, e.g., Joel F. Bruneau, A Note on Permits, Standards, and Technological Innovation, 
48 J. ENVTL. ECON. & MGMT. 1192 (2004); Juan-Pablo Montero, Permits, Standards, and Technological 
Innovation, 44 J. ENVTL. ECON. & MGMT. 23 (2002); Juan-Pablo Montero, Market Structure and 
Environmental Innovation, 5 J. APPLIED ECON. 293 (2002) (trading, taxes, or traditional regulation can best 
encourage research and development when firms’ products are strategic substitutes); Malueg, supra note 
131; W. A. Magat, Pollution Control and Technological Advance:  A Dynamic Model of the Firm, 5 J. 
ENVTL. ECON. & MGMT. 95 (1978); see also David M. Driesen, The Economic Dynamics of Environmental 
Law:  Cost-Benefit Analysis, Emissions Trading, and Priority Setting, 31 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 501, 
519-20 (2004) (stating that trading may have an overall negative affect on innovation); David M. Driesen, 
Does Emissions Trading Encourage Innovation?, 33 ENVTL. L. REP. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10094 (2003) (arguing 
that trading may encourage less innovation than a comparable performance standard, but suggesting that it 
may change the type of innovation).   
 186 Margaret R. Taylor et al., Regulation as the Mother of Invention:  The Case of SO2 
Control, 27 L. & POL’Y 348, 370 (2005) (concluding that trading encouraged less innovation than command 
and control). 
 187 See id. (discussing reliance on wet scrubbers and low sulfur coals); Choi, supra note 5, at 
887 (stating that the acid rain program has encouraged reliance on low-sulfur coal and scrubber 
installation); Swift, supra note 61, at 10332 (describing scrubbing and low-sulfur coals as the principle 
compliance means, but finding innovation in blending techniques and scrubber design); cf. David Popp, 
Pollution Control Innovations and the Clean Air Act of 1990, 22 J. POL’Y ANALYSIS & MGMT. 641 (2003) 
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 Since most economists tend to focus on efficiency, rather than sustainable 
development they generally tend to discuss innovation under the rubric of “dynamic 
efficiency.”188  This refers to the capacity of a program to lower costs through innovation 
to maximize net benefits to the current generation.189  They do not usually focus on a 
program’s capacity to induce high cost innovation, which may be of special interest to 
sustainable development and may either augment quality or deliver cost savings relevant 
in timeframes longer than that of a particular regulatory program.   
 Emissions trading provides inferior incentives for relatively expensive innovation, 
because emissions trading lowers routine compliance’s cost.190  This means that trading 
lowers the price point where innovation becomes cost effective.  To see this imagine two 
pollution sources.  One of these polluters, who we’ll call Buyer, has marginal control 
costs of $1,000 per ton of carbon reduction.  The other, who we’ll call Seller, has 
marginal control costs of $500.00 a ton.  If we require each of these sources to meet a 
carbon reduction target of 100 tons, a performance standard approach, then Buyer will 
acquire an incentive to seek out innovations costing less than $1,000.00 a ton.  If we 
allow trading, however, Buyer will be able to purchase 100 extra $500.00 per ton 
reductions from Seller instead of achieving compliance locally.  Under this scenario only 
innovations costing less than $500.00 a ton begin to penetrate the industry.191   
                                                                                                                                                 
(finding more patenting of scrubber technology under command and control than under the acid rain 
trading program, but finding a shift in the type of innovation encouraged under trading).    
188          See DRIESEN, supra note 34, at 71.  
189           See ID. 
 190 See Driesen, supra note 52, at 336 (pointing out that spatial flexibility makes it easier “to 
deploy a well understood control method”).  
 191 In reality, marginal control costs usually rise as a facility increases reductions.  Thus, this 
example is oversimplified.  But this simplification does not influence the results.  Even if the low cost 
facility generates incurs higher costs for the reductions sold to buyer than for the reductions made to merely 
achieve compliance, these extra reductions must still cost substantially less than the cost of routine 
compliance at buyers’ firm to make trading worthwhile.   
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 Trading proponents point out that vast differences in marginal control costs are 
common.  This is the reason that trading generates substantial costs savings.   This means 
that trading should lower the marginal control costs for an industry substantially, thereby 
significantly reducing incentives for relatively expensive innovation.   
 The observation that reducing the cost of routine compliance should reduce 
incentives for relatively expensive innovation is consistent with a hypothesis economists 
commonly employ in analyzing innovation, the induced innovation hypothesis.  This 
hypothesis assumes that rational actors innovate when adhering to routine becomes too 
costly.192  That assumption would suggest that lowering routine compliance costs through 
trading would reduce, not augment, incentives for relatively expensive innovation.   
 Our entrepreneur’s choice can illustrate the reasons for trading’s tendency to 
favor cheap routine measures over expensive innovation.  As she decides whether to 
employ solar energy or an end-of-the-pipe control she probably thinks about her potential 
customer, the German electric utility owner.  The rational actor model would predict that 
this customer will only want to pay for credits costing less than his utility’s marginal 
control cost.  Hence, if a solar installation costs more than the marginal cost of local 
control in Germany, our entrepreneur cannot hope to recoup her investment if she invests 
                                                                                                                                                 
 Indeed, the example in some ways understates the depth of global trading’s weakness in 
stimulating expensive innovation.  One would expect trading to lower the marginal control costs of a large 
group of buyers, which might constitute about half of the participants in a trading program.  And it would 
systematically lower the costs, and hence the price points innovators must meet, to the level of the cheapest 
reductions available anywhere within the universe of sources eligible to generate credits.  In a global 
market, that universe is likely to be large and the opportunities for cheap routine reductions enormous.   
 192 Cf. Matschoss & Welsch, supra note 172, at 173 (referring to this hypothesis as the 
assumption of “induced factor-saving technological change”).  
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in solar energy.  Renewable energy often costs a lot and innovative new renewable 
energy technology may reflect significant research and development costs.193   
 Even if local conditions in sunny India are so propitious for solar energy that our 
entrepreneur can generate carbon credits costing less than the German utility’s local 
costs,194 she may think twice before investing in a novel solar energy technology.  When 
she sells her credits, she may have to compete with other entrepreneurs for the sale.  This 
competition may induce her to choose the cheapest option, even if both options cost less 
than the German utility’s marginal cost.195  In other words, competition may pressure our 
entrepreneur to choose the end-of-the-pipe approach.  Market reports do claim that HFC 
reduction costs much less than renewable power, so the available data supports the theory 
that trading disfavors relatively expensive innovation.196   
 This analysis helps explain why targeted regulatory programs should perform   
better than global emissions trading in encouraging renewable energy.  The Kyoto 
Protocol contemplates a 5% drop in developed country emissions.  Achieving this target 
through a global trading program should encourage a whole series of projects like the 
HFC project, which cost much less than renewable energy projects.  If, however, the 
world creates a renewable portfolio standard demanding that new renewable energy 
                                                 
 193 See Paolo Bertoldi et al., White, Green & Brown Certificates:  How to Make the Most of 
Them, paper # 7203, at 11 (2005), http://energyefficiency.jrc.cec.eu.int/pdf/publications/ 
ECEEE%202005%20paper%207%20203%20final.pdf (stating that the ETS will probably do little to 
encourage renewable energy because “renewables have higher marginal abatement costs” than other carbon 
mitigation options).  
 194 See DESSLER & PARSON, supra note 1, at 103 (pointing out that solar power is “already 
cost competitive in some niche applications”).  
 195 See CDM Watch, supra note 123, at 16 (buyers and investors favor projects requiring the 
least investment).  
 196 See Ellis & Karousakis, supra note 124, at 8 -9 (stating that renewable energy projects 
typically have relatively high abatement costs; industrial gas projects have low costs); cf. Capoor & 
Ambrosi, supra note 7, at 9 (discussing the lack of an internationally recognized price index and the 
tendency to keep prices and contract structures confidential).  See generally Michaelowa & Butzengeiger, 
supra note 88, at 3 (predicting that the “EU emissions trading will not induce development of technologies 
that currently have high . . . costs,” such as renewable energy, because of low allowance prices). 
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deployment create a 5% drop in carbon emissions, thus limiting the range of reduction 
options, this will create more expensive innovation, along with its associated positive 
spillovers.  And this greater stimulation of innovation will persist even if the targeted 
program allows for trading carbon credits generated by deployment of renewable energy 
projects.  Hence, recognition of the tension between global cost effectiveness and 
targeted innovation efforts can help explain why the data presented should not be 
surprising.        
 Some project developers acting in the global carbon markets, however, have 
chosen to develop renewable energy projects, albeit on a relatively small scale.197  The 
existence of these projects suggests that market actors may not fully conform to the 
rational actor model, which assumes that actors maximize their profits by seeking low 
cost projects.198  Some credit purchasers may wish to enhance their reputations by 
purchasing credits reflecting renewable energy projects.199  Indeed, sustainable 
development advocates have developed a “gold standard” for CDM projects, giving 
projects advancing sustainable development an environmentalist seal of approval.200  This 
approach suggests that these advocates see market decisions as susceptible to social and 
political influences, not only profit maximizing behavior.201  
                                                 
 197 See Ellis  & Karousakis, supra note 124, at 8. 
 198 See generally White, supra note 20, at 65 (firms make decisions to maximize profits).  It 
is also possible that in some locations renewable energy proves extremely cost effective. 
 199 See Pearson, supra note 123, at 15 (suggesting that “some buyers” will pay a premium 
for renewables credits for public relations reasons).  
 200 See http://www.cdmgoldstandard.org/.  
 201 The NGO strategy involves persuading stakeholders that gold standard credits offer 
greater value and less risk than credits reflecting projects that NGOs have not specifically endorsed.  See id.  
cf. Iain McGill et al., Some Design Lessons from Market-Based Greenhouse Gas Regulation in the 
Restructured Australian Electricity Industry, 34 ENERGY POL’Y 11, 17 (2006) (markets have discounted 
credits for renewable energy produced by burning native forest waste in response to NGO opposition).  See 
generally Kysar, supra note 8, at 2156 (identifying “infusing public policy elements into markets” as an 
important phenomenon that has attracted little attention); Douglas Kysar, Preferences for Processes:  The 
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 I do not claim that a categorical rule prohibits trading from stimulating renewable 
energy.  Indeed, as governments impose more stringent caps on sources raising their 
control costs, the ability of renewable energy projects to play some role should increase.    
The data in this paper generally represent a very early picture of the trading market’s 
response to the EU’s phase one emission limits and the inchoate possibility of stricter 
limits in phase two.  The insight at the core of my claim, however, that lowering cost 
does not increase incentives for innovation is fully consistent with standard economic 
models that show a correlation between technological incentives and permit prices.202  
Nor do I claim that traditional regulation does a wonderful job of stimulating innovation, 
although it sometimes has done so when sufficiently stringent.203  I make only the narrow 
claim that a performance standard encourages more expensive innovation than a trading 
program of identical stringency.  While stricter limits can encourage more innovation, for 
any given level of reduction trading tends to encourage postponement of the investments 
that polluters with high marginal costs might otherwise make to avoid costly routine 
                                                                                                                                                 
Process/Product Distinction and the Regulation of Consumer Choice, 118 HARV. L. REV. 525, 529 (2004) 
(explaining that information about how goods are produced can influence consumer choice). 
 202 See, e.g., Pedro Linares et al., Impacts of the European Emissions Trading Scheme 
Directive and Perit Assignment Methods on the Spanish Electricity Sector, 27 ENERGY J. 79, 88, 91 (2006) 
(forecasting switches to natural gas combined cycles but no other “new” technology, because “the permit 
price is not high enough”). 
 203 See Schwarze, supra note 109, at 57-58 (stating that demanding traditional regulation 
produces strong incentives for innovation); DRIESEN, supra note 34, at 52-53 (discussing cases when 
traditional regulation has encouraged innovation); Kurt Strasser, Cleaner Technology, Pollution 
Prevention, and Environmental Regulation, 9 FORDHAM ENVTL. L. J. 1, 28-32 (1997) U.S. CONGRESS, 
OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, GAUGING CONTROL TECHNOLOGY AND REGULATORY IMPACTS IN 
OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH- AN APPRAISAL OF OSHA’S ANALYTICAL APPROACH, OTA-ENV-
635, at 6, 89-90, 95 (1995); Nicholas A. Ashford et al., Using Regulation to Change the Market for 
Innovation, 9 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 419, 440-41 (1985); Nicholas Ashford & George R. Heaton Jr., 
Regulation and Technological Innovation in the Chemical Industry, 46 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 109, 139-
140 (1983). 
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controls.  A tradeoff exists between short term cost effectiveness and investment in long-
term environmental and economic development.204   
  C.  Implications for Sustainable Development and Market Liberalism 
 Recognizing the value of positive spillovers exposes the tension between the 
short-term cost effectiveness markets favor and long term economic and environmental 
progress.  This tension has implications for the conceptual relationship between 
sustainable development and market liberalism, for environmental policy, and for 
institutional design, which I address in turn.      
                                                 
204     Emissions trading’s failure to stimulate projects increasing energy efficiency stems from the 
peculiarities of the Kyoto trading design, rather than a general failure of trading to encourage cost 
effectiveness.  See Bertoldi et al., supra note 193, at 11 (pointing out that end-use energy efficiency 
provides “low-cost” carbon reduction); Bryner, supra note 102, at 271 (describing making energy efficiency 
investments as a “no regrets” policy).  The parties’ decision to allow trades with sources whose emissions 
remain uncapped threatens the program’s integrity, because it creates a potential to give up reductions from 
regulated sources in exchange for positive changes that would happen even without a trading program. See 
Sandra Greiner & Axel Michaelowa, Defining Investment Additionality for CDM Projects-Practical 
Approaches, 31 ENERGY POL’Y 1007, 1007 (2003) (linking the lack of targets for reductions in developing 
countries to potential problems with CDM’s integrity).   In order to avoid this danger, the Kyoto Protocol 
requires that credit only be granted for projects yielding “additional” emission reductions. Kyoto Protocol, 
supra note 2, art. 12(5)(c); Marrakesh Accords, January 21, 2002, FCCC/CP/2001/13/Add.1-Add., 
Decision 17/CP.7, Annex para. 43.  See KYOTO MECHANISMS, supra note 91, at 193 (explaining that 
certification of credits for  energy efficiency projects that would have been used anyway would lead to 
increased emissions).   Because many energy efficiency projects are economically attractive on their own, 
they have difficulty satisfying this criterion. K. Umamaheswaran & Axel Michaelowa, Additionality and 
Sustainable Development Issues Regarding CDM Projects in Energy Efficiency Sector, HWWA 
Discussion Paper 346, at 2, http://www.hwwa.de (characterizing additionality analysis of energy efficiency 
projects as “cursory.”); KYOTO MECHANISMS, supra note 91, at 193 (using introduction of “improved 
energy efficiency technologies that would have become widely used” anyway as the example of an 
additionality problem).  The Kyoto Protocol’s language suggests a “project additionality” test, that the 
project produce real additional reductions, but the regime has included to some degree a “financial 
additionality test” that would require that the credit purchases are essential to making the project go.   See 
Michael Dutschke & Axel Michaelowa, Development Assistance and CDM- How to Interpret `Financial 
Additionality,’” 11 ENVT. & DEV. ECON. 235 (2006) (discussing an interpretive issue with regard to 
financial additionality’s relationship to foreign aid); CDM Watch, supra note 123, at 22-23 (quoting an EU 
program elaborating additionality testing as acknowledging a general recognition that only projects that 
would not have taken place without the purchase of credits meet additionality criteria); Umamaheswaran & 
Michaelowa, supra, at 22 (noting that the CDM Executive Board has required evidence that CDM revenue 
was considered at the design stage for “prompt start projects”).   A design that only allowed trades with 
sources subject to caps might well encourage energy efficiency. See Robert N. Stavins, Implications of the 
US Experience With Market-Based Environmental Strategies for Future Climate Change Policy, in 
EMISSIONS TRADING, supra note 55, at 66-67 (recognizing that programs allowing “an unregulated source” 
to generate credits require review lest credits be given for reductions “that would have taken place in any 
event”). 
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 1.  On Sustainable Development’s Relationship to Market Liberalism -   
 If we employ a weak sustainability concept, than any use of technology that 
addresses climate change advances sustainable development and the cost effective HFC 
solution is fine.  If we employ even a moderately strong version of the concept, however, 
a rift opens between the partners to Kyoto’s conceptual shotgun marriage.  For initially 
expensive technological innovation has a vital role to play in sustainable development by 
facilitating the protection of future generations from shortages of finite resources and 
serious climate change risks.  Market liberalism has defects in encouraging future 
economic welfare and environmental protection, because it fails to correct private actors’ 
unwillingness to pay for important positive spillovers.205 
 2.    Lessons for Environmental Law - A moderately strong version of 
sustainability requires that environmental policy address the tradeoff between short-term 
cost effectiveness and long-term sustainable development.206  This lack of automatic 
coincidence between near-term cost effectiveness and long-term technological 
development does not dictate abandonment of global trading, but it does suggest that an 
assumption that liberal trading serves as a panacea for failures to innovate has little 
                                                 
205           Our entrepreneur may consider the value of receiving a longer stream of direct carbon 
benefits from the solar project than the HFC project would generate.  She may sharply discount the value of 
future carbon reductions, even though their value to future generations might be nearly as high as the early 
reductions.  The parties to Kyoto have not yet agreed to targets beyond 2012, which lessens incentives to 
thyink about long-term streans if reductions.  Even if she considers long-term benefits that she can realize 
profits from, there remains no reason for her to consider spillovers, such as the value of her technological 
contribution to other suppliers’ future development of solar energy.  
 206 Accord Schwarze, supra note 109, at 53 (recognizing “a general tradeoff between the 
goals of “stimulating new technology and . . . dynamic efficiency”); DESSLER & PARSON, supra note 1, at 
170-71 (explaining that emissions trading exploits “cheap opportunities” to deploy “presently available” 
technology, but undermines the incentives to develop the new technologies that may reduce long-term 
costs); see, e.g., Palmer & Burtraw, supra note 114, at 59 (explaining that the most cost effective way to 
encourage renewable energy employs a carbon trading design that is more costly than a standard design).  
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justification.207  Other works have addressed the issue of how to encourage innovation in 
detail and my main concern here is with sustainability’s relationship to market liberalism, 
rather than with technical environmental law reforms.208  Accordingly, I will only state a 
few general lessons about environmental policy design here.  
 First, sustainable development’s need for innovation suggests that policy-makers 
should make stimulation of significant technological change a conscious goal of 
environmental policy, at least in contexts like that of climate change, where continued 
exploitation of current technologies might seriously harm future generations.209  The 
technological success of the regulations that this Article highlights does not prove that 
traditional regulation in general succeeds in stimulating innovation.  Many of the 
regulations highlighted here have a goal of stimulating technological development, not 
just emission reductions.  These regulations may stimulate innovation because policy-
makers consciously designed them to encourage technological improvements.  For 
example, renewable portfolio standards stimulate innovation, because they simply require 
unconventional technological choices.210  The analysis here suggests that policy-makers 
must consciously seek to encourage innovation, especially expensive innovation, and not 
assume that it will come about from just any market-based approach.     
                                                 
 207 See Stavins, supra note 204, at 71-72 (stating that “little is known empirically about the 
impact of these instruments on technological change” and that “there is . . . no policy panacea”).   
 208 See, e.g., David M. Driesen, Sustainable Development and Air Quality:  The Need to 
Replace Basic Technologies with Cleaner Alternatives, 32 ENVTL. L. REP. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10277, 10285-
10290 (2002) (discussing various alternatives); DRIESEN, supra note 34, at 151-161, 183-201.  
 209 See generally Richard B. Stewart, Regulation, Innovation, and Administrative Law:  A 
Conceptual Framework, 69 CAL. L. REV. 1256, 1260-61 (1981) (concluding that innovation is needed just 
to keep environmental problems from getting worse as economic growth continues). 
 210 See Choi, supra note 5, at 934 n. 308 (calling renewable portfolio standards “the most 
effective policy tool” for increasing renewable energy’s market share).  
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 Second, policy-makers and scholars should more creatively explore the use of 
economic incentives and traditional regulation to encourage innovation.211  For example, 
consider the idea of an Environmental Competition Statute.212  Instead of relying on 
government standard setting (as in emissions trading) or taxation, such a statute would 
authorize any company making a pollution reduction to recoup its cost plus a pre-set 
premium from competitors with higher emissions.213  Such a system would encourage 
firms to compete to maximize environmental quality, rather than respond only to the 
limited incentives sometimes timid government officials create by regulatory or taxation 
decisions.214   
 Third, concern for innovation should play a major role in the design, not just the 
selection, of instruments, for innovation depends not just on the selection of regulatory 
instruments, but also on rather technical design considerations.215  The LEV program 
provides an example of design’s importance.  By limiting averaging to vehicle fleets, 
instead of fully embracing a liberal free market model, California regulators limited 
trading’s capacity to undermine innovation necessary to meet stringent performance 
                                                 
 211 See, e.g., Mandel, supra note 158, at 64-69 (proposing a “patent rewards system” for 
environmental technology).  
 212 See DRIESEN, supra note 34, at 151-161.  
 213 See ID. at 151-54 (explaining that both emissions trading and pollution taxes depend upon 
government decisions to drive pollution reduction and suggesting mandatory payments to less polluting 
competitors as an alternative). 
 214 See ID. at  154 (explaining that the Environmental Competition Statute relies on polluters 
hopes of besting competitors and fears of losing out to them to motivate reductions). 
 215 See Jody Freeman & Daniel A. Farber, Modular Environmental Regulation, 54 DUKE L.  
795, 836 (2005) (characterizing “careful attention to design” as “crucial”); McGill et al., supra note 201, at 
23 (explaining that absent appropriate design poor quality credits can crowd out high quality credits); see, 
e.g., Atle Midttun & Kristian Gautesen, Feed in or Certificates, Competition or Complementarity?  
Combining a Static Efficiency and a Dynamic Innovation Perspective on the Greening of the Energy 
Industry, __ ENERGY POL’Y __, __ (2006) (forthcoming) (green certificate systems “with free competition 
between all renewable technologies” will not support “the broader technological development necessary to 
further subsequent generations of renewable technology.”); Palmer & Burtraw, supra note 114, at 25 
(advocating allocating carbon allowances based on output, which favors renewable energy providers with 
the opportunity to sell all of their allowances). 
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standards.216  Auto-makers could surely avoid the high costs of making hybrid vehicles if 
they could make up the emission reductions by purchasing cheap credits from any source 
of relevant emissions in the world.217  The restriction of trading, however, makes it harder 
to rely on cheap routine solutions.218  Design plays a critical role in both traditional and 
“market-based” regulation’s capacity to stimulate innovation.219    
 While these principles of making innovation a goal, more creative exploration of 
mechanisms, and conscious design for innovation may seem obvious once stated, 
scholars and regulators frequently overlook them.  This design principle merits further 
treatment here, for government’s role in design provides a link between the trading case 
and broader institutional issues about the proper roles of governments and markets. 
 Selection of regulatory targets constitutes one of the most important design 
considerations for an emissions trading or traditional regulatory program.220  An 
                                                 
 216 See James MacKintosh, The Car Industry Needs Carbon Trading, FIN. TIMES, July 3, 
2006, at 17 (suggesting that a broader trading scheme would allow car manufacturers to avoid 
manufacturing hybrid vehicles and vehicles using biofuels). 
 217 See California Environmental Protection Agency Air Resources Board, Staff Report:  
Initial Statement of Reasons for Proposed Rulemaking, Public Hearing to Consider Adoption of 
Regulations to Control Greenhouse Gas Emissions from Motor Vehicles vii (2004) (prohibiting use of 
credits from non-vehicle measures or for measures outside of California to avoid diluting carbon reduction 
regulations’ technology forcing effect).    
 218 See Matschoss & Welsch, supra note 172, at 170 (noting that a number of writers have 
argued that placing limits on trades increases incentives for technological innovation); Choi, supra note 5, 
at 937 (recommending a cap on credits from foreign countries to address “deterrence of long-term 
technological improvements”).   
 219 See Michael Grubb et al., Technological Change for Atmospheric Stabilization:  
Introductory Overview to the Innovation Modeling Comparison Project, 27 ENERGY J. 1, 14 (2006) 
(highlighting the need for clear signals through long-term targets and characterizing the policy implications 
of considering innovation as “far more subtle” than questions of choosing between trading and traditional 
regulation); DRIESEN, supra note 34, at 183-201 (explaining principles of regulatory design and making 
illustrative reform recommendations).  The acid rain program sought to encourage renewable energy by 
setting aside allowances for renewable energy.  See 42 U.S.C. § 9651c(f),(g).  But this feature had little 
effect.  See Choi, supra note 5, at 891 n. 86.  We need more research about designing trading programs to 
encourage innovation.  Cf. id. at 936-37 (opining that “direct allocations of allowances to renewable energy 
sources would function as a much more powerful tool for accelerating the commercial development of 
renewable energy technologies.”)  
 220 See Michael Grubb, et al., Allowance Allocation in the European Emissions Trading 
Scheme:  A Commentary, 5 CLIMATE POL’Y 127, 127 (2005) (describing the “allocation of allowances” as 
“the most . . . important step” for “any emissions trading system”).  
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emissions trading scheme depends for its efficacy on standard government decisions 
about regulatory stringency, i.e. the amount of reductions to require.221  Some have 
criticized EU members for allocating too many allowances to industrial sources during 
the EU Trading Scheme’s first phase.222  By setting a cap near, or in some cases, above 
then current emission levels the EU lost an opportunity to make significant carbon 
reductions in phase one and to provide some incentives for innovation.223  Conversely, if 
governments set ambitious caps for emissions trading schemes, these can greatly increase 
pressure for significant technological changes.  This relationship between regulatory 
stringency and incentives for technological advancement is not unique to emissions 
trading.224  Government decisions determining the stringency of performance standards 
or the amount of pollution taxes also influence the magnitude of incentives to innovate.225  
But proponents of “innovative market-based mechanisms” sometimes suggest that 
emissions trading automatically reduces emissions, thereby obscuring the importance of 
collective political decision-making in setting caps.226   
                                                 
 221 See id. (allowance allocation determines the total emission reductions and the magnitude 
of incentives for change); see, e.g., Choi, supra note 5, at 902-03 (describing California’s RECLAIM 
program as a “failure” because the South Coast Air Quality Management District set the cap too high). 
 222 See Grubb, et al., supra note 220.   
 223 Id. at 131-32  (finding the allocations in phase one inconsistent with serious effort meet 
Kyoto targets and unlikely to encourage innovation); Gaming Gases, THE ECONOMIST 69 (June 10, 2006) 
(because of overallocation of allowances and other design features the EU Emissions Trading Scheme 
“failed to boost alternatives.”). 
 224 See Palmer & Burtraw, supra note 114, at 31 (explaining that the stringency of a 
renewable portfolio standard affects the prospects of different classes of renewable energy).  
 225 See DRIESEN, supra note 34, at 197 (explaining the link between stringency and 
innovation).  
 226 See, e.g., EMISSIONS TRADING, supra note 55, at 4 (describing “cap-and-trade systems” as 
representing “a transition to market-based instruments which rely totally on market-based forces to create 
the necessary . . . incentives”).  
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 In principle, the choice to use emissions trading should make it easier to set more 
stringent caps than regulators would set for a traditional regulation.227  Since emissions 
trading lowers compliance costs, government officials making cost sensitive decisions 
should feel more comfortable setting ambitious goals when it uses trading than when it 
employs a traditional performance standard.  It is also possible that the flexibility that 
trading provides might reduce polluters’ opposition to ambitious requirements.  Market 
liberalism in the selection of regulatory means may contribute to governments’ 
willingness to establish regulatory goals compatible with sustainable development.   
 Yet, it would be a mistake to assume, without further research, that an inexorable 
political economy law always makes instrument choice a critical determinant of 
stringency.  The European Union, for example, favored stringent targets while opposing 
broad liberal trading.228  And the United States in the past has supported bans on some 
chemicals and stringent standards for other pollutants without fully exploring costs and 
with little or no reliance upon trading.229  This suggests that factors other than cost 
effectiveness may influence government policy choices.230     
                                                 
 227 Accord Thomas Sterner & Henrick Hammar, Designing Instruments for Climate Policy, 
in EMISSIONS TRADING, supra note 55, at 18.  
 228 See DESSLER & PARSON, supra note 1, at 15 (explaining that many European countries 
wanted less flexibility to use foreign emission reduction credits than the U.S., Russia, Japan, and Canada 
wanted); cf. Michaelowa & Butzengeiger, supra note 88, at 2-3 (the EU opposed trading in the run-up to 
Kyoto but embraced it afterwards).      
 229 See, e.g., Environmental Defense Fund v. EPA, 489 F.2d 1247 (D.C. Cir. 1973) 
(upholding a ban on DDT). 
 230 I am providing general thinking about the political economy of trading, not a 
comprehensive empirical analysis of the particulars of Kyoto’s political economy.  Emissions trading did 
prove essential to the Kyoto Protocol’s entry into force, but not sufficient.  It became necessary to grant 
extra allowances to Russia to obtain ratification, thereby potentially coupling trading with weaker limits.  
This suggests that once countries treat costs as critical, trading alone may not be sufficient to get them on 
board, but rather laxity may be necessary.  See David M. Driesen, Choosing Environmental Instruments in 
a Transnational Context, 27 ECOLOGY L. Q. 1, 47 (2000) (raising the possibility of relaxing stringency to 
buy assent to a regulatory regime).     
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 Governments’ sensitivity to estimates of future costs may vary depending upon 
their leaders’ attitudes toward neoliberalism.  The United States’ opposition to Kyoto in 
spite of its use of trading and statist Europe’s support for targets without global trading 
suggest as much.231  Trading cannot save an agreement from a government determined to 
eschew regulation altogether and it may not be necessary to persuade other governments 
to sign up.  The idea that sensitivity to cost may vary with ideology is also congruent with 
empirical research on risk perception, showing a correlation between individual attitudes 
toward risk and more general attitudes toward governments and markets.232  Those who 
favor collective solutions to problems may tend to believe cost projections anticipating 
learning by doing through regulation, which have sometimes predicted net savings from 
vigorous efforts to address climate change, while neoliberals may tend to favor the 
economic models predicting much higher costs.233    
                                                 
 231 See Michaelowa & Butzengeiger, supra note 88, at 1-2 (explaining that the EU supported 
“stringent absolute emissions targets for industrialized countries” and opposed international trading for a 
long time).  
 232 See Dan M. Kahan et al., Fear of Democracy:  A Cultural Evaluation of Sunstein on Risk, 
119 HARV. L. REV. 1071, 1072 (2005) (book review) (finding that “cultural worldviews” influence risk 
perception); cf. Cass Sunstein, Misfearing:  A Reply, 119 HARV. L. REV. 1110, 1111 (2005) (agreeing that 
cultural cognition influences risk perception, but arguing that officials should correct misperceptions of 
facts).   Professor Kahan and his coauthors explain that “egalitarians” tend to favor environmental 
regulation and that “individualists” tend to trust markets and react skeptically to environmental risks.  
Kahan et al., supra, at 1083-84.  Their empirical research confirms previous research finding that the 
egalitarians are more concerned about global warming and other environmental hazards than the 
individualists.  Id. at 1086.  
 233 Id. at 1088 (explaining that cultural world views influence perceptions of both the costs 
and benefits of dangerous activities); Terry Barker et al., Avoiding Dangerous Climate Change by Inducing 
Technological Progress;  Scenarios Using a Large-Scale Econometric Model in DANGEROUS, supra note 
132, at 362-64 (discussing the wide divergence of results in economic models assessing the costs of climate 
change abatement).  Professor Kahan argues that differences among experts reflect their divergent world 
views.  Kahan, supra note 232, at 1092-1094.  He also argues that experts may “screen arguments and 
evidence” to protect their status and beliefs.  Id. 1094.  This suggests that economists may neglect learning 
by doing in economic modeling, because recognizing the importance of something difficult to quantify 
threatens their status, but others may create numbers because their worldviews favor doing something about 
global warming. 
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 Furthermore, trading’s cost savings can only influence goal setting if policy 
makers consider those cost savings before they materialize.234  If trading succeeds in 
uncovering cost effective reductions not obvious to regulators, it follows that it further 
weakens the officials’ ability to predict future costs.  Hence, setting goals that take 
trading’s cost savings into account may require a leap of faith that some may not be 
prepared to make.     
 The literature on political economy explains that polluters may favor 
grandfathered trading programs over pollution taxes, because only taxes leave them with 
costs for residual emission.235  But a preference for trading does not inexorably make 
industry supporters of strict targets.236  Industry federations in many countries have 
fought for weak caps, greatly weakening the EU’s trading scheme’s first phase.237   
 Market liberalism might ideologically undermine setting goals necessary to 
achieve sustainable development, even though free market mechanisms lower costs that 
                                                 
 234 See Driesen, supra note 230, at 49 (pointing out that the availability of lower cost 
abatement options in foreign countries will only affect the stringency of limits for a trading program if the 
government considers those cost savings); cf. Ratification Aside, supra note 72, at 2117 (states reducing 
greenhouse gas emissions report that doing so creates new jobs, develops new technologies, and lowers 
energy costs).  
 235 See Nathaniel O. Keohane et al., The Choice of Regulatory Instruments in Environmental 
Policy, 22 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 313, 348-51 (1998) (explaining that polluters must pay taxes on residual 
emissions, but need not pay for those emissions under trading); James M. Buchanan & Gordon Tullock, 
Polluters’ Profits and Political Response:  Direct Control Versus Taxes, 65 AM. ECON. REV. 139, 141-142 
(explaining why polluters may prefer regulations to taxes). 
 236 See Michaelowa & Butzengeiger, supra note 88, at 5 (explaining how lobbying in the EU 
lead to goals in phase one providing little departure from “business as usual” levels of carbon emissions).  
 237 See Grubb, et al., supra note 220, at 132-33 (describing industry lobbying’s contribution 
to the EU’s overallocation of phase one emission allowances); Michaelowa & Butzengeiger, supra note 88, 
at 3 (pointing out that German industry lobbied against the EU emissions trading directive and that the 
chemical and aluminum industries lobbied, successfully, for their exclusion from the scheme); see also 
France Haggles over Banking Rules as Second NAP Set to Miss Deadline, POINT CARBON (June 15, 2006), 
available at http://www.pointcarbon.com/article16056-868.html?articleID=16056&categoryID= 
(mentioning a French industry’s advocacy of a high phase two cap).  
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can impede ambitious goal setting.238  Neoliberalism’s political economy may prove 
more complicated than many analysts have assumed.239        
 3.  Institutional Relationships (of Government and Markets) - Broadly speaking, 
market liberalism’s advocates usually envision a broad role for markets and sustainable 
development advocates tend to rely more heavily on collective decision-making.  The 
emissions trading case suggests that the question of the proper role of governments and 
markets is much more complicated than generally assumed.   
 All serious efforts to address environmental protection involve a significant role 
for markets and for government.  Traditional regulation establishes markets by 
demanding environmental improvements that require firms to hire people and/or purchase 
equipment to reduce pollution.240  And an economic incentive, in the form of a civil 
penalty for violations of regulatory requirements, encourages them to do so.241  On the 
other hand, “free market mechanisms” require active government roles in establishing 
goals and in enforcement.242  Ignoring either the economic incentives that regulatory 
programs create or government’s role in designing and enforcing them can lead to serious 
failures.243   
                                                 
 238 See, e.g., Choi, supra note 5, at 950 (attributing the U.S. failure to implement to Kyoto to 
“an economic way of thinking,” which stresses “short-term costs rather than long-term benefits.”).  
 239 See Driesen, supra note 230, at 47 (explaining that no economic reason exists for a 
polluter to agree to emissions trading, unless government is willing to impose a more costly alternative).  
 240 Driesen, supra note 52, at 293; see Samuel P. Hays, The Future of Environmental 
Regulation, 15 J. L. COM. 549, 565-66 (1996) (characterizing traditional standards as the most significant 
“market force” in environmental protection). 
 241 Driesen, supra note 52, at 336.  
 242 See Robert W. Hahn & Gordon L. Hester, Where Did All the Markets Go?  An Analysis 
of EPA’s Emissions Trading Program, 6 YALE J. REG. 109, 111 (1989) (monitoring and enforcement issues 
play a critical role in trading program design); Ackerman & Stewart, supra note 52, at 1352-59 (linking 
trading to a system that provides for democratic goal setting).  
 243 See, e.g., Ruth Greenspan Bell, Choosing Environmental Policy Instruments in the Real 
World CCNM/GF/SD/ENV(2003)10 (arguing that emissions trading may not work well in countries 
lacking the capabilities to define and implement complex systems); Driesen, supra note 10, at 22 
©David M. Driesen 2006,  9/20/2006 Draft 
59 
 A credit’s purchase price will not reflect some important non-carbon benefits and 
costs, such as bad effects on communities, positive immediate health benefits, and 
contributions to future technological development of energy sources.  As a result, 
entrepreneurs like our woman in India may not consider these factors in making 
technological choices.244   
  The Kyoto emissions trading case raises questions about the notion that 
government should absent itself from oversight of technological choices made in 
pursuing environmental goals.  Sustainable development advocates believe that 
technological choices made in pursuit of one environmental objective, such as carbon 
reduction, implicate broader sustainable development concerns that merit consideration 
when these choices are made.  They tend to evaluate technological choices not only in 
terms of their carbon reduction potential, but also in terms of their contribution to long-
term technological solutions and their collateral impacts on communities.  From the 
perspective of market liberalism, government processes to consider public comments and 
review projects generating credits for their impacts on sustainable development constitute 
“transaction costs” impeding markets, which governments should minimize.245  Serious 
regard for sustainable development or intergenerational efficiency, however, requires 
some consideration of the positive and negative externalities, effects not felt by parties to 
                                                                                                                                                 
(discussing the collapse of a New Jersey emissions trading program because of efforts to delegate 
monitoring to a private agency). 
 244 See, e.g., Haripriya Gundimenda, How Sustainable is the Sustainable Development 
Objective of CDM in Developing Countries Like India, 6 FOREST POL’Y & ECON. 329, 333 (2004) (project 
developers are likely to overlook micro level issues that determine whether afforestation and conservation 
projects for credit harm or help the poor).     
 245 See Stavins, supra note 204, at 66 (referring to government approval of individual trades 
as transaction costs); David M. Driesen & Shubha Ghosh, The Functions of Transaction Costs:  Rethinking 
Transaction Cost Minimization in a World of Friction, 47 ARIZONA  L. REV.  61, 79-82 (2005) (reviewing 
transaction cost minimization’s role in emissions trading).  
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a transaction, inherent in technological choices.246  This suggests that governments 
should not reflexively reduce transaction costs (such as opportunities for public 
comment) without considering their corollary benefits, in this case, in providing for 
consideration of spillovers benefiting future generations and intragenerational equity.247  
More fundamentally, the existence of these externalities raises questions about the 
assumption that single-minded cost effective pursuit of a single goal through emissions 
trading, as advocated by neoliberalism, constitutes an adequate vision of technological 
choice for sustainable development.    
 The positive spillovers and negative externalities stemming from technological 
choices also raise questions about the internal consistency of market liberalism.  Many 
advocates of CBA’s use in defining environmental goals defend it, in part, by pointing 
out that government must evaluate risk/risk tradeoffs.248  This tradeoff concept refers to 
the danger that industry response to a mandate to reduce one form of pollution may 
increase other more serious risks, a danger sustainability advocates have cited in 
opposing CDM projects like the eucalyptus plantation mentioned previously.249  NYU 
Dean Richard Revesz has responded to the risk/risk critique by pointing out that reducing 
                                                 
 246 See James E. Krier, Risk and Design, 19 J. LEGAL STUD. 781, 782 (1990) (explaining that 
externalities arise when A & B “mistransact” with respect to C, whose interest they do not take into 
account).   
 247 See Driesen & Ghosh, supra note 245, at 92-98 (discussing the tension between the 
impetus to reduce transaction costs to encourage trading and the need to preserve effective government 
oversight to protect environmental quality from poor quality trades); accord Stavins, supra note 204, at 66 
(the negative effects of transaction costs “should be balanced against any anticipated benefits due to 
required government approval”). 
 248 See, e.g., Cass Sunstein,  Health-Health Tradeoffs, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 1533 (1996); John 
D. Graham & Jonathan Baert Wiener, Confronting Risk Tradeoffs, in RISK VERSUS RISK:  TRADEOFFS IN 
PROTECTING HEALTH AND THE ENVIRONMENT 1 (John D. Graham & Jonathan Baert Wiener, eds. 1995); 
Symposium, Risk-Risk Analysis, 8 J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY 5 (1994); Randall Lutter & John F. Morrall III, 
Health-Health Analysis:  A New Way to Evaluate Health and Safety Regulation, 8 J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY 
1 (1993); AARON WILDAVSKY, SEARCHING FOR SAFETY 212 (1988) 
 249 See Kysar, supra note 169, at 258-59 (defining risk-risk analysis as focusing decision-
makers on the secondary ancillary harms that come from regulating a chosen harm).   
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a targeted risk often reduces another corollary risk.250  For example, if our entrepreneur 
chooses a solar project to reduce carbon, her project will also displace smog-producing 
pollution from a nearby coal-fired power plant that severely threatens health in the near 
term.  Of course, industry’s technological choices determine the existence and scope of 
ancillary risks and benefits.  This implies that in order to use CBA to evaluate collateral 
risks (and benefits), government must know in advance what technologies industry will 
use to comply with government standards and must consider the associated risks (and 
collateral benefits).  Yet, the use of a global market reduces the government’s ability to 
predict technological choices, thereby undermining CBA.251    
 Indeed, global trading fundamentally undermines even a sharply circumscribed 
CBA focusing only on direct costs and targeted benefits.  For the cost of reducing any 
environmental risk depends on the technological choices made in addressing it.252  If the 
government uses a trading mechanism, it undermines its ability to estimate these costs.253  
For increasing spatial flexibility widens the universe of possible technological options 
thereby complicating prediction of technological choices.  Of course, policy-makers can 
reduce this tension by not relying on cost sensitive decision-making in setting goals or by 
                                                 
 250 See Richard L. Revesz, The Biases of Risk Tradeoff Analysis:  Toward Parity in 
Regulatory Policy, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 1763, 1766 (2002) (faulting risk tradeoff analysis’ neglect of 
“ancillary benefits”).  
 251 See David M. Driesen, Trading and Its Limits, 14 PENN ST. ENVTL. L. REV. 169, 173 
(2006) (leaving the choice of technologies to regulated parties leaves the government with “no timely 
means of evaluating risk/risk tradeoffs”).  
 252 See Driesen, supra note 230, at 49-50 (government must consider data of polluters’ 
abatement costs if it wishes to consider cost in setting a cap for a tradable permit program).  Compare 
Wiener, supra note 43, at 775 (suggesting that only “technology-based regulation” depends upon agency 
consideration of abatement costs).  
 253 See Kysar, supra note 169, at 268 (noting that analysts expected acid rain permits to cost 
$1,500 a tone, but that they have traded for as little as $66.05 a ton).  
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eschewing broad liberal trading.  But broad liberal trading reduces government’s capacity 
to accurately evaluate costs and benefits in setting goals.254 
 Trading’s capacity to undermine CBA suggests a tension between market 
liberalism’s institutional preference for markets and its analytical concepts.  For these 
concepts demand a comprehensive consideration of costs and benefits, while markets rely 
on the decisions of private actors, who may only consider their action’s costs and benefits 
to themselves.255 
 On the other hand, sustainable development advocates have not showed how their 
preferred concept should concretely guide government regulation.  Its vagaries may serve 
well as a framework for democratic debate.256  But the rubric does not function precisely 
as a guide to macro-level decisions.257  This imprecision may constitute a virtue in some 
settings, but it leaves sustainable development open to charges of irrationality.     
 The trading case reveals that sustainable development advocates face some other 
challenges in seeking to apply collective decision-making to technological choices.  
Richard Stewart has likened “command-and-control” regulation to discredited Soviet 
style central planning.258  This charge clearly exaggerates the depth of technological 
control regulators exercise through traditional regulation.  As a rule, traditional regulation 
only demands a specified improvement in environmental performance from a particular 
                                                 
 254 See Driesen, supra note 251, at 173 (pointing out that CBA is more likely to be wrong 
when a trading approach is used than when it is not used, because it is difficult to predict the magnitude of 
the trading program’s cost savings).  
 255 See EMISSIONS TRADING, supra note 55, at 3 (stating that once government allocates 
allowances its “action is limited to supervising the market, monitoring, and applying sanctions in the case 
of non-compliance.”)  
 256 See SEGGER & KHALFAN, supra note 45, at 4 (noting that sustainable development’s 
‘inclusiveness” helped it guide diverse local, national, and international communities).  
 257 See ID. (explaining that sustainable development does not function as a “scientific 
blueprint” for decision-makers and that this has caused “difficulties” in recent years).  Cf. White, supra 
note 20, at 27-39 (explaining sources of great indeterminacy in efficiency determinations). 
 258 See Richard B. Stewart, Economic, Environment, and the Limits of Legal Control, 9 
HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 1, 6 (1985). 
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industry.259  It does not fix production quotas, nor does it commonly dictate fundamental 
technological choices, such as fuel choice for power production.260   
 But sustainable development’s call for collective decision-making and integrated 
planning seems to require substantial community control over fundamental technological 
choices, much more control than either traditional regulation or emissions trading usually 
offers.  While both sustainable development and economic rationality may require some 
role for collective decision-making in making fundamental technological choices, it is not 
clear that having government make key technological choices by itself is desirable.261  
Public choice theory, another contribution of neoliberal thinking, predicts that special 
interests will heavily influence government decision-making.262  Many sustainability 
advocates would agree with that analysis.263     
 Indeed, government technological decisions have played a greater role in Kyoto’s 
failure to adequately address climate change than any decision about instrument choice 
                                                 
 259 See Richard B. Stewart, A New Generation of Environmental Regulation, 29 CAP. U. L. 
REV. 21, 94 (2001) (“command-and-control methods .  . . limit . . . the quantity of residuals that each actor 
may generate).  
 260 See Swift, supra note 61, at 10336-37 (explaining that traditional regulations have 
accommodated different base technologies for power generation, instead of encouraging shifts to cleaner 
fuels and boiler designs).    
 261 See POSNER, supra note 16, at 160 (referring to government’s “well known” inability to 
pick “technological winners”).  See generally, Kysar, supra note 8, at 2147-48 (detailing a host of reasons 
to be skeptical of government’s ability).   
 262 See generally KENNETH J. ARROW, SOCIAL CHOICE AND INDIVIDUAL VALUES (1963) 
JAMES M. BUCHANAN & GORDON TULLOCK, THE CALCULUS OF CONSENT:  LOGICAL FOUNDATIONS OF 
CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY (1962); cf. JERRY L. MASHAW, GREED, CHAOS, AND GOVERNANCE:  USING 
PUBLIC CHOICE TO IMPROVE PUBLIC LAW (1997); Mark Kelman, On Democracy-Bashing:  A Skeptical 
Look at the Theoretical and `Empirical’ Practices of the Public Choice Movement, 74 VIRGINIA. L. REV. 
(1988); Daniel A. Farber & Philip E. Frickey, The Jurisprudence of Public Choice, 65 TEXAS L. REV. 873 
(1987); ARMATYA K. SEN, THEORY OF COLLECTIVE CHOICE (1970).   
 263 See, e.g., Jim Vallette & Steve Kretzman, The Energy Tug of Ward:  The Winners and 
Losers of World Bank Fossil Fuel Finance, at 2 (2004) (chiding the World Bank for funding projects 
benefiting “Northern fossil fuel corporations”).  
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could possibly correct.264  While evidence that climate change seriously threatens us and 
our descendants mount, leaders of the countries with the world’s most rapidly growing 
economies have supported construction of numerous new coal-fired power plants, often 
with the support of taxpayer supported international lending institutions.265 
 Sustainable development advocates might attribute this failure to a lack of 
sufficient democratization and a failure to use integrated planning.  But the problem may 
run deeper.  Even if the economists’ call to discount future benefits is at war with 
sustainable development, their recognition that people tend to discount future benefits 
reflects a widespread reality.  This suggests that sustainable development’s procedural 
allegiance to integrated planning may not lead to achievement of sustainable 
development’s substantive aspirations.  For many people participating in collective 
decision-making may prove reluctant to incur costs in order to protect future generations’ 
welfare.266   
   I do not mean to disparage efforts by sustainable development advocates to make 
government more transparent and democratic, which may indeed prove helpful.  But the 
question of how to design institutions to make wise fundamental technological changes 
presents a puzzle, a puzzle that lies sadly buried under much simplistic rhetoric about 
“economic incentives” and “command and control” regulation.  In other words, if it’s 
                                                 
 264 See Baumert, supra note 3, at 388 (noting that the CDM is likely to generate reductions 
totaling just 1.5% of developing country emissions, while these emissions grow more than 3 percent 
annually).  
 265 See Vallette et al., supra note 125 (criticizing World Bank subsidies of fossil fuel 
extraction and use and estimating their magnitude).  This report estimated the lifetime carbon emissions 
from World Bank financed projects at $43.4 billion, much more than one year’s world energy consumption.  
Id. at 1.  The World Bank disputes this figure, largely because it does not view projects extracting fuel for 
export as producing carbon emissions.  Id. at 4, 12.  
 266 See Cass Sunstein, Irreversible and Catastrophic, 91 CORNELL L. REV. 841, 864 (2006) 
(stating that public resistance to paying now to reduce future risks fits standard claims about discounting).  
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clear that government must have some role, this analysis of sustainable development and 
market liberalism suggests that we need more thinking about that role’s precise nature. 
 One might think that governments should not participate actively in selecting 
technologies to meet climate change goals.  But governments have actively participated 
in technological choice not only in processes largely untouched by Kyoto (e.g. Chinese 
construction of coal-fired power plants), but under the Kyoto Protocol trading regime 
itself.  The Canadian government, among others, has purchased credits directly as a 
substitute for demanding reductions from their own pollution sources (which might in 
turn purchase credits).267     
 This government purchase approach represents a pure government subsidy just as 
surely as feed-in tariffs or tax breaks do.  Traditionally, economic liberals and sustainable 
development advocates have been in rough accord about the proper role of government 
subsidies, when they are used.  Government subsidies should aid fledgling industries 
where risks are too great to attract sufficient private capital and great public benefits 
might result from the investment.268  Neoliberal skepticism about government’s capacity 
to follow these rules often leads to outright opposition to subsidies.269  By contrast, 
sustainable development advocates have no particular objection to government 
subsidizing their preferred technological choices.  But if subsidies are used, there may be 
agreement that they should be used for options like renewable energy and, if it meets 
                                                 
 267 See REPORT OF THE STANDING COMMITTEE ON ENVIRONMENT AND 
SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT, FINDING THE ENERGY TO ACT: REDUCING CANADA’S 
GREENHOUSE GAS EMISSIONS, SESSIONAL PAPER NO. 8510-381-136 2005, at 44 (2005).   
 268 See Kverndokk et al.,  Climate Policy and Induced Technological Change:  Which to 
Choose, the Carrot or the Stick?, 27 ENVTL. & RESOURCE ECON. 21, 23 (2004) (stating that with perfect 
information the government should subsidize technologies with positive spillovers, but that government can 
discourage new technology by subsidizing existing technology). 
 269 Cf. Wiener, supra note 43, at 726-727 (opposing subsidizing pollution abatement in part 
because polluters “may posture to receive secure larger subsidies”).  
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sustainability criteria, nuclear power.  Yet, the spirit of Kyoto may be driving 
governments to view themselves as market participants, and to seek out least cost 
solutions instead of undertaking short term risks to realize long-term benefits.  This 
would suggest institutional preferences for markets driving out conceptual coherence in 
government policy.  In other words, the preference for markets relying on a private actor 
model may deter government from playing its appropriate role in correcting market 
failures and catalyzing technological improvements benefiting future generations.  
Governments’ behavior as market participants, not just regulators, in the Kyoto trading 
regime clearly merits further research and analysis.          
  A broad array of tools may encourage private actors to innovate, such as 
Environmental Competition Statutes, phase-outs of inappropriate older technology 
(which may leave the market with quite a lot of freedom to find substitutes), and taxes.270  
The confrontation between sustainable development and market liberalism in the trading 
regime suggests that we need more thinking about proper institutional roles in stimulating 
significant technological change.  
V. CONCLUSION 
 The emissions trading experience under the Kyoto Protocol suggests that weak 
market liberalism might manage to co-exist with weak sustainability.  Either a strong 
preference for markets (as opposed to economic concepts) or a strong concept of 
sustainability, however, tends to sever the union.  Liberal markets, even markets designed 
for environmental protection, often fail to encourage expensive investments leading to 
long-term benefits because of positive spillovers.     
                                                 
 270 See, e.g., Driesen, supra note 185, at 10285 (discussing the idea of phasing out coal-fired 
power); DRIESEN, supra note 34, at 151-161, 193-210.  
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 The problem of the proper role of collective decision-making in technological 
change poses a puzzle requiring much closer attention.  Emissions trading’s tendency to 
undermine CBA suggests that neoliberalism’s institutional direction conflicts with its 
analytical predilections and with sustainable development.  On the other hand, collective 
decision-making does not provide a panacea either, as shortsightedness can infect both 
public and private spheres.  Study of the emissions trading experience under the Kyoto 
Protocol yields fascinating insights about the relationship between sustainable 
development and market liberalism.  We can only hope that the nations of the world will 
build on these insights as they move forward in addressing climate change and other 
major global challenges.            
      
  
 
